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Abstract
Can economic integration succeed between one rich and relatively powerful partner and one poor 
and relatively powerless partner in the context of security tensions between them? This paper eva-
luates the economic reality resulting from peace treaties conceived between Israel and Palestine, 
countries with intentions of integration and interdependence, but that has resulted in a de facto situa-
tion of de-development and a higher degree of economic dependence.  The context of the study was 
evaluated based on the mercantilist and liberal theories of the 17th century.  The actual conditions 
prevailing in Palestine-Israel relations are far from those of a liberal context. Neither are sovereign 
states at peace. Rather, Israel is a well-established sovereign state with an impressively developed 
economy and a strong army, while Palestine is an occupied nation with no formal state, fledgling insti-
tutions, a developing economy and no army. Moreover, the context of Palestine-Israel relations is not 
one of peace, but one of military occupation and war. Due to this power gap between the two parties 
and the context of occupation and war, the de facto regime and policies regulating and updating the 
economic relationship between them have been very different from what is established de jure under 
existing economic integration agreements. Therefore, the results in terms of economic development 
and institution building for Palestine have not been at all what one would expect from a process of 
economic integration between two free well-established states at peace with each other.
Keywords: Palestine, Israel, mercantilism, liberalism, de-development, economic integration.
Resumen
¿Puede tener éxito la integración económica entre un socio rico y relativamente poderoso, y un socio 
pobre y relativamente impotente en el contexto de tensiones de seguridad entre ellos? Este documen-
to evalúa la realidad económica resultante de los tratados de paz concebidos entre Israel y Palestina, 
países con intenciones de integración e interdependencia, pero que ha dado lugar a una situación de 
facto de desarraigo y mayor grado de dependencia económica. Se evaluó el contexto del estudio con 
base en las teorías mercantilistas y liberales del siglo XVII,. El estudio muestra que las condiciones rea-
les que prevalecen en las relaciones entre Palestina e Israel están muy lejos de las de un contexto libe-
ral. Palestina e Israel no son dos estados soberanos y en paz. Más bien, Israel es un estado soberano y 
bien establecido con una economía impresionantemente desarrollada, con un ejército fuerte, mientras 
que Palestina es una nación ocupada sin estado formal, instituciones incipientes, una economía en 
desarrollo y sin ejército. Además, el contexto de las relaciones palestino-israelíes no es de paz, sino 
de ocupación y guerra militares. Debido a esta brecha de poder entre las dos partes y el contexto de la 
ocupación y la guerra, el régimen de facto y las políticas que regulan y actualizan las relaciones econó-
micas entre ellos han sido muy diferentes de lo que se establece de jure bajo los actuales acuerdos de 
integración económica. Por lo tanto, los resultados en términos de desarrollo económico y construcción 
de instituciones para Palestina no han sido en absoluto lo que se esperaría de un proceso de integra-
ción económica entre dos estados libres y bien establecidos en paz unos con otros.
Palabras Claves: Palestina, Israel, mercantilismo, liberalismo, De-development, integración eco-
nómica.
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1. Mercantilism and Liberalism and 
their Times
Mercantilist and Liberal theories and econo-
mic policies have prevailed in the world at very 
different times. Mercantilist or nationalist eco-
nomic theories have prevailed at times of war 
and insecurity, national rivalry, state-building 
and economic development. They are the po-
licies of hard times led by fledgling states with 
not-yet-developed economies aiming at stren-
gthening their economic autonomy and institu-
tional structures. They were first developed by 
Colbert in the 17th century and implemented 
in France as well as throughout Europe as the 
post-Westphalia process of nation-state buil-
ding and intra-European strife unfolded. They 
were equally espoused by Friedrich List and 
German policy-makers during the nineteen-
th-century period of German economic deve-
lopment and political unification as well as by 
Alexander Hamilton in the United States at a 
very similar time in the history of his country. 
Mercantilism reflects the needs of economies 
and states whose neighbors are not their 
friends –except possibly tactically—and, thus, 
who cannot take security for granted. Its au-
thors and implementers assume that there is 
no trade-off between politics and economics or 
between power and plenty. Rather, they believe 
that, in their circumstances, power and securi-
ty considerations with their state-building and 
economic autonomy corollaries need to be the 
guiding principles of their economic policies. 
For them, overseeing long-term survival con-
siderations for the sake of potential short-term 
economic gain would mean that there would be 
no plenty to be had (and possibly no state left 
either). In a mercantilist world, a state which de-
pends economically on its neighbor is a weak 
and vulnerable state whose fragility will be used 
against it. On the contrary, a strong state is a 
state which is economically autonomous from 
its neighbor and, hence, does not depend on it. 
A strong state is also a state which has sound 
and efficient national institutions, needed both 
to ensure its security as well as underpin its 
economy.
Liberal theories and policies, on the contrary, 
have prevailed at times of peace and stability. 
They are the policies of times of trust between 
neighbors with relatively strong states and rea-
sonably well-developed economies. They were 
first theorized by Adam Smith and David Ricar-
do. Both economists were not coincidentally 
born in England, one of the most well-establi-
shed states and the most developed economy 
of the time. Liberal policies have been progres-
sively adopted across the world as states and 
economies develop.1 Even once states and 
economies have progressed from the mercanti-
list to the liberal phase, they can have relapses 
at times of economic recession and political in-
security (as was the case in the interwar period 
in Europe). When a certain level of economic 
development and state authority have been es-
tablished, however, it is easier to revert back to 
liberal thinking and policies, especially within 
multilateral frameworks. At that stage of deve-
lopment, willing leaders can build institutions 
and international regimes to cement liberalism 
as they did in the western world after World War 
 ¹ The World Bank Development Report (2009a) con-
firms this long-established relationship and its evolution: 
“Rich countries tend to have the lowest barriers to trade and 
factor mobility…as countries develop, they gradually lower 
almost all types of barriers.”  (p. 96-97) “Each of today’s suc-
cessful regions initially developed its manufacturing sector 
behind a fairly substantive wall of tariffs and other protec-
tions. Only as their economies matured…did they gradually 
open their borders and integrate regionally and globally” (p. 
119). 
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II and in Western Europe first through the Com-
mon Market and later on through the European 
Union. 
For mature states with relatively well-developed 
economies, economic integration also beco-
mes possible and even desirable. For deve-
loped economies at peace, competition from 
their neighbors is not a threat to their autonomy, 
but a spur to economic growth. Similarly, insti-
tution-building at the national level is no longer 
the end in itself that it can appear to be to tho-
se establishing a new country. On the contrary, 
states can focus on building common regional 
institutions to cement shared interests and de-
fend them in the rest of the world even at the 
expense of relative loss of national sovereignty. 
In this context, considerations of relative gain 
(relative economic growth rates, bilateral balan-
ces of trade, bilateral foreign investment flows, 
labor flows or even relative political power) be-
come less important as the threat of war and 
the likelihood of use of economic leverage for 
political gain among neighbors fades. It is the 
time at which states can focus on mutual gain, 
believe in and implement systems that foster 
positive-sum gains and concern themselves 
with security and prosperity for the region as a 
whole. 
Economic integration, in short, is based on mu-
tual trust, belief in joint economic benefits and a 
sense of security by those involved. It requires 
abiding by the rules of the game of economic 
integration which the economic and political be-
nefits it generates help to reinforce. For these 
conditions to prevail and regional integration to 
proceed even in a context of peace, however, 
there needs to be a rough parity between the 
integrating parties. In fact, states that have en-
gaged in economic integration processes are 
either typically all large (e.g. US, Canada, Mexi-
co) or all small (Benelux). Other agreements 
have included particular guarantees and incen-
tives for small states within a non-threatening 
multi-lateral regional framework (as in the EU). 
In no case has economic integration willingly 
proceeded between one rich and (relatively) 
powerful and one poor and (relatively) power-
less partner in the context of security tensions 
between them. This is probably so because, 
in such a context, what is likely to develop is 
economic and political dependence --rather 
than inter-dependence-- and the weaker party 
would not wish to place itself in such an eco-
nomic and politically vulnerable situation in a 
conflict situation. The case of the economic re-
lations between Israel and Palestine, however, 
offer a case study of what can transpire in such 
a situation.
For the transition phase between a mercantilist 
and a liberal framework to start, war needs to 
be over. Fostering cooperation in a context of 
war and occupation leads to an increase in the 
areas of friction and in the tools available for 
each side to inflict damage on the other. This si-
tuation creates incentives for aggression throu-
gh economic means and conflict escalation, 
hence delaying the day in which true conflict 
resolution can begin. Moreover, in a context of 
inequality between two sides, attempts to en-
hance cooperation between them actually lead 
to deepening the dependence of the weaker on 
the stronger partner, distorting its economic re-
lations and de-legitimizing its institutions. 
2. Palestine-Israel Relations –A 
Mercantilist or a Liberal Context?
Since the 1990s, many analysts and poli-
cy-makers have been operating as if the rele-
vant framework to apply to Palestine’s econo-
mic relations with Israel were that of liberalism. 
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The economic regimes and policies which they 
have propounded and implemented have re-
flected the assumptions of a liberal world. They 
have focused on stepped up economic integra-
tion in trade, labor flows, revenue management 
and private sector economic relations, inclu-
ding in such strategic sectors as energy. These 
economic integration goals have been reflected 
in the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and, in particu-
lar, in the Paris Protocol of 1994 and the Agree-
ment on Movement and Access of 2005. These 
blueprints outline a de jure customs union (CU) 
bordering on a common market, including free 
trade in goods and services, a common exter-
nal tariff and, to a certain degree, free flows of 
labor.2
The actual conditions prevailing in Palestine-Is-
rael relations, however, are far from those of a 
liberal context. Palestine and Israel are not two 
sovereign and rich states at peace. Rather, Is-
rael is a sovereign and well-established state 
with an impressively developed economy and 
the strongest army in the Middle East while 
Palestine is an occupied nation with no formal 
state, fledgling institutions, a developing eco-
nomy and no army. Moreover, the context of Pa-
lestine-Israel relations is not one of peace, but 
one of military occupation and war. Because 
of this power gap between the two parties and 
the context of occupation and war, the de facto 
regime and policies regulating and actualizing 
² Arnon and Weinblatt (2001) have pointed out the dis-
crepancy between the de jure and the de facto regimes 
prevailing in Palestine-Israel relations. In particular, they 
argue that, despite de jure economic integration, econom-
ic separation has prevailed de facto. In our view, however, 
speaking of “separation” in the context of occupation is a 
contradiction in terms. What we have, as will be argued, is 
an asymmetrical power relationship which allows de facto 
arbitrary use by Israel of the de jure framework to foster its 
perceived economic self-advantage and to use it as a po-
litical and economic bargaining chip including, periodically, 
to inflict collective punishment as retaliation on Palestine. 
the economic relationship between them have 
been very different from what is established de 
jure under existing economic integration agree-
ments (which themselves reflect an uneven 
power balance between the parties). Therefo-
re, the results in terms of economic develop-
ment and institution-building for Palestine have 
not at all been what would be expected from a 
process of economic integration between two 
free well-established states at peace with each 
other. 
This discrepancy between de jure agreements 
and de facto reality and its negative impact on 
the Palestinian economy has been increasin-
gly acknowledged by economic analysts.3 This 
paper builds on this literature and purports that 
the degree of economic integration with Israel 
that has been imposed on Palestine in the cu-
rrent context of war and occupation is counter-
productive for the Palestinian economy. In this 
regard, it argues that the recommendations of 
mercantilists for economic autonomy from par-
ties with which a country is at war are well-taken 
and constitute a better framework within which 
to analyze Israeli-Palestinian economic rela-
tions. In this guise, it recommends the enhan-
cement of the economic autonomy of Palestine 
from Israel. In no way does the paper espouse 
attempting economic self-sufficiency or exces-
sive protectionism, both of which would be im-
practicable and self-defeating, especially for 
such a small economy. Rather, it recommends 
building on own resources while diversifying 
economic relations, deepening economic ties 
with neighbors such as Egypt and Jordan when 
advantageous and maintaining open relations 
with the rest of the world. 
 ³ In addition to Arnon and Weinblatt (2001) , see Di-
wan and Shaban (1999), and the various reports of the Aix 
Group (2004) and Arnon and Bamya (2007).
Me
rc
an
tili
sm
 or
 Li
be
ra
lis
m?
 E
co
no
mi
c A
ut
on
om
y a
nd
 S
ta
te
-B
uil
di
ng
 in
 Pa
les
tin
e
64 Revista Internacional de Cooperación y Desarrollo Vol. 3 No. 2 | Año 2016 | PP. 59-98
This chapter will aim at: a) summarizing the re-
quired conditions for successful economic inte-
gration to pan out; b) describing the de jure fra-
mework regulating Palestine-Israel economic 
relations; c) presenting the economic regime 
and policies which de facto regulate these re-
lations; d) outlining the economic transmission 
mechanisms between regime and policies to 
economic outcomes; e) analyzing the economic 
and political consequences of the combination 
of the existing unimplemented de jure and im-
plemented de facto frameworks (dependence, 
de-development and institutional de-legitimiza-
tion); f) presenting some conclusions from the 
preceding analysis; and g) putting forth some 
recommendations for enhancing economic au-
tonomy in going forward.
3. Required Conditions for Suc-
cessful Economic Integration
Recent reviews of international trade and regio-
nal economic integration hold powerful lessons 
for the Palestinian-Israeli context. This section 
will briefly examine two of them –the 2009 World 
Development Report on Reshaping Economic 
Geography and a 2003 World Bank review of 
Regional Integration Arrangements. In both ca-
ses, the conditions the studies lay out for fruitful 
trade and economic integration to take place 
are not fulfilled in the Palestinian-Israeli context 
due to the circumstances of war and occupa-
tion.
The 2009 World Development Report identi-
fies three basic variables determining trade 
between countries: density (size of the trading 
partner’s economy), distance (physical market 
access between trading partners) and division 
(the effects of borders). The first two variables 
are promising for trade prospects between Is-
rael and Palestine due to the size of the Israeli 
economy (density) and the geographical proxi-
mity between both countries (distance). Howe-
ver, the third variable (division) works in a unila-
teral direction making market access for Israeli 
goods into Palestine relatively easy, but market 
access for Palestinian goods into Israel extre-
mely difficult. As we will see, this unevenness of 
access greatly reduces the potential gains from 
trade for Palestine and has critically impaired 
the development of the Palestinian economy, 
especially since the 1990s. 
A 2003 World Bank study of regional integra-
tion and development is also enlightening in 
our context. The report reviewed worldwide 
empirical evidence on the impact of regional 
economic integration on growth and economic 
development (Schiff & Winters, 2003).  At the 
end, the study draws a number of conclusions it 
calls “rules of thumb for regionalism.” This sec-
tion will summarize the rules of thumb that are 
most relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian context 
and assess how they affect the likelihood of the 
existing Oslo-backed customs union between 
the two parties to yield the expected gains from 
regional integration. 
North-South RIAs are preferable--In principle, 
North-South RIAs are preferable to South-Sou-
th agreements because, whereas there is em-
pirical evidence that the former can stimulate 
growth, there is no evidence of this effect in 
the latter. A key reason why North-South RIAs 
tend to perform better than South-South ones 
is that they are more likely to increase competi-
tion and lead to better trade, greater investment 
and more foreign direct investment-related te-
chnology transfers. From this point of view, a 
regional economic agreement between Pales-
tine and Israel sounds promising. However, the 
Fadi Kattan
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2009 WDR points out that an important reason 
why South-South RIAs do not tend to generate 
much growth spillovers is that “despite regional 
trading arrangements, there is no real integra-
tion”, chiefly because of lack of market access 
(World Bank, 2009a: 102).
RIAs need to foster real competition—A key rou-
te through which the economic growth effects of 
RIAs are channeled is greater competition. For 
this competition to occur, however, effective in-
tegration needs to take place and that requires 
more than simply reducing tariffs and quotas. It 
necessitates the removal of any other barriers 
that have the effect of segmenting markets and 
impeding the free flow of goods, services, in-
vestment and ideas. Namely, for a RIA to truly 
integrate economies, all barriers to trade and 
investment need to be eliminated between par-
ticipating countries. This real integration is nee-
ded for the crucial competition effects between 
economies as well as industrial agglomeration 
effects to take place.  
Credibility gains require explicitness--especia-
lly in North-South RIAs, a positive effect of re-
gional integration is to enhance the credibility 
of the government policies of the developing 
country partner. This effect in turn often helps 
to encourage foreign direct investment. Howe-
ver, for this effect to pan out, the transition path 
to free trade needs to be fully specified, with a 
minimization of reversals in liberalization, the 
prohibition of application of instruments of con-
tingent protection and the establishment of bin-
ding dispute-settlement mechanisms that are 
not contingent on foreign policy considerations. 
Only efficient RIAs are likely to help politically—
Regional integration is often used to foster po-
litical goals, such as enhancing the security of 
and political cooperation among partners. The 
review points out, however, that RIAs can help 
solve political problems only if they function 
well.  On the contrary, if they do not, they can 
have the opposite effects.
As will transpire throughout this paper, the abo-
ve-listed conditions do not hold in the Palesti-
nian-Israeli context. First off, despite a customs 
union existing from a legal de jure point of view, 
there are  a plethora of non-tariff barriers to tra-
de between Palestine and Israel (checkpoints, 
the separation wall, permit systems, etc.). Mo-
reover, these barriers go mostly in one direction 
creating a myriad of obstacles to economic ac-
tivity within Palestine and for exports from Pa-
lestine into Israel leading to unfair competition 
for the Palestinian economy.4 Hence, the “com-
petition effect” predicated on real integration 
cannot pan out. The enormous and unpredicta-
ble barriers to economic activity between both 
countries as well as the context of occupation 
and war with the risk it entails also prevent coo-
peration across firms, foreign direct investment 
and any related agglomeration and technology 
transfer effects. Second, the “credibility” effect 
on PA government policies is impaired by the 
fact that the degree to which the de jure cus-
toms union is applied is de facto completely 
unpredictable and unilaterally determined by 
Israel. In reality, therefore, the effect is the oppo-
site –delegitimizing the PA and undermining the 
credibility of its policies. Finally, the application 
of a peace-time regional integration framework 
in a context of war and occupation, far from buil-
ding confidence and fostering peace, increases 
points of friction between the two parties, pro-
vides tools for economic aggression, exacer-
bates the conflict and delays the coming of the 
time in which true cooperation can commence.
⁴ The result of this asymmetry has been dubbed as a 
“one-sided customs union.” (Diwan & Shaban, 1999: 84). 
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4. De jure Economic Institutions 
and Assumptions Underlying Them
The de jure framework for the economic rela-
tions between Palestine and Israel is determi-
ned by the Oslo Accords and, in particular, by 
the “Protocol on Economic Relations” or “Paris 
Protocol” (subsequently incorporated into the 
Interim Agreement of 1995).5 It was initially devi-
sed to regulate the economic relations between 
the Palestinian Authority and Israel during the 
interim period that was to last until 1999 when 
final status in the relations between both parties 
was expected to be reached. 
The Agreement aims to establish a customs 
union between the PA and Israel by basically 
extending the Israeli trade regime to Palesti-
ne. According to the Agreement, the PA has to 
apply at least the same level of customs and 
other duties as Israel, except for goods inclu-
ded in three lists: A1, A2 and B. For goods under 
these lists, the PA is given some limited power 
to modify the basic Agreement. In particular, for 
some items it has the right to determine tariff 
rates and other import taxes. The items in list A1 
are some goods produced in Jordan, Egypt and 
some other Arab countries. The items on list A2 
are some basic foodstuffs from other countries. 
The items on list B are some equipment goods 
considered important for development pur-
poses. Even for the goods on lists A1 and A2, 
however, import quantities need to be within the 
limits set jointly between the PA and Israel and 
determined according to Palestinian market 
needs. These items in the agreed quantities are 
also exempt from meeting Israeli standards and 
licensing requirements. 
Therefore, de jure, the Agreement allows Pa-
 5 This section draws heavily from Calika (1998).
lestinian goods free access to the Israeli market 
as well as to the markets of the countries with 
which Israel has free trade agreements (the EU, 
the US, EFTA member states, Canada, Turkey, 
Mexico, Romania and Bulgaria). Moreover, sin-
ce the time of the signing of the Agreement, 
Israel has engaged in further economic libera-
lization and its trade regime is now very open. 
As Israel has been moving up the value added 
ladder in its manufactures, it has increasingly 
liberalized its markets toward low value added 
manufacturing imports in order to gain access 
from other countries for its high-tech and other 
high-valued added manufactures. As a result, 
the only remaining high levels of protection in 
its trade system apply to agricultural products 
(and, decreasingly, to some specific traditional 
manufacturing goods).6 Overall, therefore, the 
regime features low tariffs on manufactures and 
relatively high tariffs on agricultural products. By 
2005, the weighed average most-favored-na-
tion (MFN) tariff rate applied to agricultural pro-
ducts was over five times that applied to indus-
trial products.7
Unlike in typical customs unions (the ones exis-
ting outside contexts of occupation), the trade 
regime applied to the CU between Palestine 
and Israel is determined unilaterally by Israel. 
The PA –except in the very limited cases men-
tioned above—has no say in its trade policy 
toward third countries. Because the common 
external tariff of the CU is determined by Israel 
without the participation of the PA, it reflects 
Israel’s economic interests and stage of deve-
⁶ Beverages, clothing, footwear and plastics industries 
are the manufacturing sectors with the highest level of pro-
tection (World Bank, 2006a: 48). 
⁷ The average applied MFN tariff was 8.9 percent in 
2005. MFN tariffs on agricultural products were, on average 
32.9 percent with rates varying widely and a maximum tariff 
rate of 560 percent (World Bank, 2006a: 48).   
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lopment rather than Palestinian development 
considerations. In addition, it imposes on Pa-
lestine Israel’s political-economic limitations, as 
it locks out of Palestinian trade all the countries 
which have no diplomatic relations with Israel, 
including most of the Arab world. Also, and un-
like in the case of customs unions between so-
vereign states, the PA does not collect its own 
customs revenue. Instead, the Agreement es-
tablishes that Israel will collect customs duties, 
VAT and excise taxes on imports (“clearance 
revenues”) on behalf of the PA. Moreover, the 
PA can only receive customs duties and import 
taxes on those goods marked clearly for the WB 
and Gaza as the final destination. This limitation 
reduces the tax collections received by the PA 
due to leakage (as not all goods finally imported 
into Palestine are clearly marked as such).8
A further restriction imposed by the de jure CU 
between Palestine and Israel is that any imports 
into Palestine need to meet the exacting quality 
standards demanded by Israel –which, in addi-
tion to all those typical of a developed country, 
include kashrut9 certifications for food products. 
These high quality standards may be neither 
appropriate nor necessary for a country of the 
level of development of Palestine. Very few de-
veloping countries have similar restrictions and 
it is unlikely that they would be imposed by the 
PA were it able to determine its own trade re-
gime autonomously. These standards impose 
additional restrictions on the Palestinian trade 
regime as well as costs on the Palestinian eco-
nomy.
Regarding labor flows, the wording of the Inte-
rim Agreement is exceedingly vague. Article VII 
⁸ “The extent of these (tax) leakages is unknown, but 
could be as large as 5 percent of GDP.” (Diwan & Shaban, 
1999: 87).
⁹ Jewish dietary laws.
states that: “Both sides will attempt to maintain 
the normality of movement of labor between 
them, subject to each side’s right to determine 
from time to time the extent and conditions of 
the labor movement into its area.” The article 
thus establishes a declaration of principle for 
the freedom of movement of labor between Is-
rael and Palestine. However, this declaration of 
principle is legally rather vacuous as it is imme-
diately qualified by its being “subject to” each si-
de’s ability to restrict this movement “from time 
to time.” Since the conditions under which each 
side is allowed to impose restrictions are not 
defined and neither is their timing, the simple 
de jure upshot of this article is that there will be 
freedom of movement of labor when and as far 
as each side decides. Since it is labor from Pa-
lestine that typically seeks work in Israel rather 
than vice-versa and Israel has all the political, 
economic and military means in its hands to en-
force decisions on labor movements whereas 
the PA has none, this article means that Pales-
tinian labor will be able to work in Israel when 
and under the conditions that Israel decides. 
Finally, the Paris Agreement includes some pro-
visions which are unusual for liberal economic 
integration frameworks. In particular, it contem-
plates the operation of Palestinian monopolies 
in the telecommunications and electricity sec-
tors and import monopolies in the cement and 
petroleum sectors (linked to Israeli firms). The 
impact of these monopolies on governance is 
addressed in the below section on institutional 
de-legitimation. 
The 2005 Agreement on Movement and Ac-
cess (AMA), in part reacting to the barriers to 
movement to goods and labor prevailing de fac-
to since the Oslo Agreements, was an attempt 
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to make the CU regime between the PA and 
Israel more binding. Among other things, it spe-
cifies that: crossing points will operate conti-
nuously, Israel will urgently expedite the access 
of Gaza products for export, the Rafah chec-
kpoint between Israel and Gaza will be open 
with third-party supervision and Israel will facili-
tate the passage of convoys between the West 
Bank and Gaza. These provisions are made in 
an unconditional fashion and hence seem di-
rectly applicable from a legal standpoint. The 
AMA also establishes that Israel will facilitate 
the movement of goods and people within the 
West Bank. This provision, however, is made 
conditional on “Israel’s security needs.” Since it 
is not determined who will establish what tho-
se are, it means that it is Israel alone who will 
define them as well as their consequences for 
movement and access within the West Bank. 
The AMA also establishes that the building of a 
seaport in Gaza can commence and it commits 
Israel “not to interfere” with its operation. Finally, 
the AMA states that: “The parties agree on the 
importance of the (Gaza) airport. Discussions 
will continue on the issues of security arrange-
ments, construction, and operation.” This last 
point, like that on freedom of movement within 
the West Bank, has hardly any meaningful lega-
lly-binding consequences. 
In sum, the Customs Union envisaged by the 
Paris Protocol basically describes a de jure 
expansion of the Israeli customs envelope to 
Palestine with very limited room for maneuver 
by the PA in the determination of trade relations 
with third countries. This trade regime is a very 
open one with high tariff rates applying only to 
agricultural products and some low value-ad-
ded manufactures. It also extends the exacting 
Israeli quality standards for imports to Palesti-
ne. According to the Agreements, any change 
to the trade regime is decided unilaterally by 
Israel and directly extended to Palestine. The 
provisions on labor movement included in the 
Protocol include a vague statement regarding 
the desirability of normal labor flows. More im-
portantly, they legally allow both sides to deter-
mine the degree and conditions of access of 
labor into their area. The 2005 AMA embodies 
a greater degree of specificity regarding move-
ment and access of goods and labor between 
Israel and Palestine as well as, in some areas, 
more binding legal language. 
Therefore, the de jure customs union between 
Palestine and Israel is a rather sui generis one. 
It is unilaterally rather than bilaterally determi-
ned and some of its key provisions –in particu-
lar those regarding movement and access of 
goods and labor—are legally vague, dependent 
on political considerations and subject to the in-
terpretation of the Israeli Government. 
5. De Facto Economic Institutions 
and Policies
As limiting as the de jure context of Palestine-Is-
rael economic relations may be, it only goes a 
limited way toward explaining their de facto na-
ture and consequences. What lies at the basis 
of the actual nature of those relations is the fact 
that we are dealing with two unequal partners 
in the context of war and military occupation. 
One partner is a state and the other is not. One 
is independent and the other is occupied. One 
is rich and the other is poor. One has an army 
and the other does not. One has the de jure and 
de facto power to determine the trade regime 
and labor flows and the other does not. One 
collects trade revenues for itself and the other 
party while the latter is dependent on the for-
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mer’s political willingness to transfer or withhold 
its revenues at any point in time. One has export 
contacts and access throughout the world for its 
exports while the other depends on the former 
to grant access for transit as well as for export 
contacts themselves. One has its own roads, 
ports and airports while the other is enclosed, 
cannot control the roads even within its own 
territory and has no ports or airports. One has 
an autonomous source of electricity production 
while the other depends on the former for its 
electricity supply. The actual economic context 
of Palestine-Israel relations is thus one of utter 
dependence.
The de facto status of Palestine-Israel econo-
mic relations is determined not only by its lop-
sided de jure framework and the unevenness of 
the balance of power between the two parties, 
but also by its preceding history and, in parti-
cular, the previous four decades of occupation. 
The years comprised between 1967 and today 
de-linked the Palestinian economy from its ties 
with Jordan and Egypt and led it to a distorted 
integration with Israel.10 Given the context of the 
occupation, integration was never complete or 
symmetrical. From the beginning, Israel impo-
sed barriers to Palestinian agricultural imports 
and the overall access of products from one 
side of the 1967 borders to the other was never 
symmetrical and it systematically favored Israel. 
10 This was the second “shock” to the Palestinian econ-
omy and one which in part and in a distorted manner undid 
part of the first shock. The first shock was the partition of 
Mandatory Palestine in 1948. After the 1948 war, the Pal-
estinian economy of the West Bank and Gaza was split 
off from its historical links with the coastal areas of what 
became Israel. Between 1948 and 1967, the West Bank 
became increasingly part of the Jordanian economy while 
Gaza integrated with the Egyptian economy. The 1967 oc-
cupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel partially and 
in a distorted manner “re-unified” these areas with their pre-
vious historical hinterland (which was by then, of course, a 
completely different world).
There was little public investment by the Israe-
li Government (the only one in charge at the 
time) in Palestine. Moreover, the Government 
of Israel (GoI) used administrative measures to 
hamper the establishment of any industrial fir-
ms in Palestine which could possibly compete 
with its own producers.11 The Palestinian eco-
nomy was also hamstrung by a lack of credit, 
as following the 1967 occupation, Arab banks 
withdrew and few Palestinians were willing to 
borrow from Israeli banks. 
The first decade and a half of the occupation 
was one of rapid growth based on unskilled 
labor exports to the Israeli economy and its 
one-time effect of wage increases and relative 
convergence with Israeli wage levels, and re-
mittances from workers in the Gulf countries. 
It also marked the beginning of a process of 
weakening of the productive structure of the 
West Bank characterized by declines in both 
agriculture and (an already precarious) industry 
and the over-development of the construction 
and services sectors.12 In the 1980s and 90s, 
the Palestinian economy stagnated. Diwan and 
Shaban (1999) identify four main constraints to 
GDP growth during the pre-Oslo period: asym-
metric market relations with Israel (imports into 
Palestine from Israel without borders, but with 
barriers to export for Palestinians into Israel and 
the rest of the world); regulatory restrictions 
(investment approval requirements by Israel; 
uncertainty in legal and tax frameworks); fiscal 
compression and institutional under-develo-
pment (low tax receipts; fiscal leakages to Is-
rael; limited public spending in infrastructure for 
11 “A review of the various constraints imposed by Is-
rael is extensively described in Awartani (1993) and Bahiri 
(1987).”(Arnon, Luski, Spivak & Weinblatt, 1997: 166; Awar-
tani, 1993; Bahiri, 1987).
12 See Roy (1999) and Dessus (2004). 
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development); and restricted access to natural 
resources (with confiscation of land and water) 
(Diwan & Shaban, 1999: 6). 
The impact of all these barriers and asymme-
tries with Israel on the Palestinian economic 
was dramatic. By the beginning of the 1990s, 
the Palestinian economy had been severed 
from the rest of the world and turned into a de-
pendent appendix of the Israeli economy. As 
the World Bank’s Investment Climate Assess-
ment succinctly describes:
By the eve of the Oslo Accords, the occupied 
Palestinian territories had become completely 
dependent upon Israel and had little economic 
relations with other countries. Nearly 60% of the 
West Bank’s exports and more than 90 percent 
of its imports were to and from Israel and the tra-
de deficit was nearly 45% of GDP. The figures for 
Gaza were similar, but the trade deficit was even 
higher. Palestinian enterprises were heavily re-
liant on Israelis for inputs and most production 
was sold either locally or through Israeli distribu-
tors…The enterprises that did exist were depen-
dent upon Israeli firms for inputs and almost all 
exports went to Israel or were exported through 
Israeli firms (World Bank, 2007e: 5). 
Probably because of this pre-existing de facto 
dependence, the objective of the Oslo Accords 
was to “make the most of it” and attempt to reali-
ze the conditions and benefits of true economic 
integration in Palestine-Israel relations.13 
13 This paper does not address the issue of whether 
Palestine “over-trades” with Israel. This is not an easy issue 
to establish and critically depends on the assumptions of 
the model used to estimate it. Diwan (1999) cites “various 
modeling exercises (which) have shown regional trade and 
trade with Asia would have been much larger, and trade 
with Israel much smaller, in the absence of the CU. By some 
estimates, imports from Israel may have been lower by as 
much as a half.” On the other hand, a recent World Bank 
study argues that “no support can be found for the case 
that WBG (the West Bank and Gaza) overtrades with Israel 
given their proximity, GDP, population, and other variables” 
(World Bank, 2006a: 41).
As pointed out above, however, neither the de 
jure framework nor the balance of power be-
tween the parties or the context in which they 
were engaging were promising for these con-
ditions to materialize. They did not. What mate-
rialized de facto was a regime characterized by 
three main features: a) pervasiveness of highly 
unpredictable restrictions on the movement and 
access of people and goods; b) continued con-
fiscation of natural resources (in particular land 
and water) combined with restrictions on plan-
ning and use of resources; and c) an unpredic-
table de facto regime of military and administra-
tive decisions affecting all aspects of economic 
relations including trade, labor flows, access to 
natural resources, fiscal revenue, transport ne-
tworks and energy.  
Movement and Access--The number of days of 
total closure14 declined slightly at the beginning 
of the post-Oslo period, but increased drama-
tically since the onset of the second Intifada. 
The average days of effective total closure went 
from 17 in 1990-93 down to 11 in 1994-99 and 
up to 87 in 2000-2002 and 97 in 2003-2005 
(World Bank, 2006a: 2 table 1). To the days of 
total closure need to be added the large amount 
of fixed and mobile checkpoints within the Oc-
cupied Palestinian Territories, which greatly cur-
tail freedom of movement within the area itself. 
According to the UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Terri-
tories (OCHA), in March 2007 there were 546 
14 “General closure refers to the overall restrictions 
placed on the movement of labor, goods and the factors 
of production between the West Bank/Gaza and Israel and 
between the West Bank and Gaza, and is usually accompa-
nied by prolonged delays and searches at border crossings. 
Total closure refers to the complete banning of any move-
ment and typically is imposed in anticipation of, or after, an 
extremist attack on Israel. Internal closure restricts move-
ment between Palestinian localities within the West Bank 
itself” (Roy, 1999: 69).
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physical impediments to movement in the West 
Bank (World Bank, 2007b: 3). In addition, the 
separation wall being built by Israel in the West 
Bank is also imposing increasing restrictions on 
movement and access by Palestinians and will 
do much more so once its construction is com-
pleted and existing openings cannot be used. 
Gaza has been under a regime of full closure 
since the Hamas electoral victory of 2006. This 
regime has led to the almost complete banning 
of people from entering and leaving the strip as 
well as of imports and exports of goods–with 
very few exceptions for humanitarian cases. 
In addition to these restrictions, the World Bank 
identified a number of other barriers to move-
ment and access by Palestinians. These inclu-
de administrative impediments (control of the 
population registry, permit regime, family unifi-
cation and establishment of residency), restric-
ted areas of the West Bank (settlements, res-
tricted roads, the separation wall and the “seam 
zone,” exclusion from the Jordan Valley and 
East Jerusalem and special restrictions in area 
C).15 This combination of impediments, rather 
than the general principle of normal flows of a 
typical customs union, is what defines the ac-
tual context of movement and access between 
Palestine and Israel to this day. Therefore, the 
condition of the removal of tariff as well as 
non-tariff barriers necessary for effective eco-
nomic integration has clearly been absent in the 
Israeli-Palestinian context. As the Aix Group of 
Israeli, Palestinian and international economic 
advisers remarked: “The new de facto econo-
mic regime that currently exists is a significant 
departure from the negotiated 1994 Paris Proto-
col… There is a clear contradiction between the 
15 For a detailed description of these obstacles, see 
World Bank (2007b).
basic requirements for economic recovery and 
the new regime. This contradiction is reflected 
in trade, labor, finance and other dimensions.”16
Confiscation of natural resources-- The process 
of land confiscation, which had started right af-
ter the beginning of the occupation, accelera-
ted after the Oslo Accords. Between 1996 and 
2000, the area of Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank and Gaza doubled while, between 2000 
and 2007, the confiscated area is estimated to 
have grown by a further 31 percent. The confis-
cated land was used for settlement expansion, 
the building of roads closed to Palestinians, as 
well as the security wall and its buffer or “seam” 
zone (an additional 8-9 percent of the West 
Bank)17 (The Applied Research Institute - Jeru-
salem, 2008).. By the beginning of the Oslo Ac-
cords, it was estimated that, in the West Bank, 
Palestinians were only using 15-20 percent of 
the water resources (World Bank, 2007e: 4). 
Moreover, the additional Palestinian land con-
fiscated for the construction of the separation 
wall has “included” in the “Israeli” side of the wall 
significant amounts of Palestinian water resour-
ces. 
Fiscal regime. According to the Paris Protocol, 
the Government of Israel is responsible for co-
llecting so-called “clearance revenues” (tariffs 
and VAT and excise duties on imports) on be-
half of the PA and transfer them to it. This agree-
ment was reached because of the reluctance 
of the GoI to establish “economic borders” or 
16 The Neglected Economic Dimension: Revitalizing 
the Economic Road Map. Brainstorming Session of the Aix 
Group. May 30, 2006: 1. www.aixgroup.org
17 See also, (The Israeli Information Center for Human 
Rights in the Occupied Territories (2008); and, “H. Ofran 
and D. Etkes, “Construction of Settlements on Private Land. 
Official Data” and  (Ofran & Etkes, 2007) Peace Now 2008. 
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posts at which the PA Customs Department 
could collect its own trade revenue. This reluc-
tance came from the Israeli view that, even the 
establishment of economic borders for the only 
purpose of tax collection, could be interpreted 
as an implicit recognition of those borders and 
weaken its negotiating position (Arnon & Wein-
blatt, 2001). De facto, the system of collection 
by the GoI and subsequent transfer to the PA 
has placed 60 percent of PA revenue in the 
hands of the GoI with the consequences des-
cribed in the sections below. 
Uncertainty and political leverage of the de fac-
to regime regulating economic relations. One of 
the most important defining characteristics of 
the actual regime regulating economic relations 
between Palestine and Israel is uncertainty. 
As pointed out above, this uncertainty is legi-
timized to a large extent in the de jure regime. 
This regime, defined in the 1994 Paris Protocol 
and, to a lesser extent, the 2005 Agreement 
on Movement and Access, leaves ample room 
for interpretation of the conditions under which 
policies can differ from the established gene-
ral principle of normal movement of goods and 
labor.18 However, the regime itself appears to 
be irrelevant as de facto there is no difference 
in actual policies by the Government of Israel 
between issues where the legal framework is 
more binding and those where it is vaguer. For 
instance, the stipulation made in the AMA that 
“crossing points will operate continuously” as 
18 The de jure regime includes clauses that allow Isra-
el to interrupt the normal functioning of the customs union 
subject to political and security considerations. This contra-
dicts the rule of thumb for successful economic integration 
which requires the prohibition of application of instruments 
of contingent protection and envisages the establishment 
of binding dispute-settlement mechanisms that are not con-
tingent on foreign policy considerations. This is probably 
because economic integration frameworks are envisaged 
for contexts of peace and not war-time.
well as the duty of the Government of Israel to 
transfer to the PA clearance revenues collected 
on its behalf are both stated unequivocally and 
unconditionally. Despite that, they have not at 
all been respected and the same applies to si-
milar AMA stipulations. Instead, they have been 
subject to a unilateral interpretation by the Go-
vernment of Israel regarding when it is expedi-
tious or not to implement them (according to se-
curity or other considerations). They have also 
been used as political leverage, with the GoI 
withholding clearance revenues from the PA as 
a tool to exert pressure on it or to “punish” it. 19 
Moreover, the overall uncertainty surrounding 
the future status of the West Bank and Gaza 
creates an enormous amount of legal and poli-
tical uncertainty which in turn has a dramatically 
deleterious effect on the Palestinian economy.
6. Economic and political conse-
quences of applying a liberal pea-
ce-time framework on a mercanti-
list wartime reality  
One can summarize the consequences of the 
combined application of the above-described 
de jure and de facto economic regimes and 
policies to Palestine-Israel economic relations 
19 As pointed out by the World Bank: “The GoI’s decision 
to stop transferring clearance revenue is a violation of the 
Oslo accords, under which there is no clear provision for 
Israel to withhold clearance revenues. It is not illegal under 
Israeli law, which grants such discretion to the Minister of Fi-
nance and recognizes international agreements only to the 
extent that their provisions have been ratified by the Knes-
set. A case was brought to the Israeli Supreme Court in 
which the petitioners sought to force the GoI to release the 
funds. However, the Supreme Court rejected the petition, 
and in so doing agreed with the GoI that withholding the 
funds was within the discretion of the Minister of Finance 
to prevent the funding of terrorist activities. In terms of in-
ternational law, the issue is open to debate.” (World Bank, 
2007d: 7).
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as follows:  a) dependence; b) de-development; 
and c) institutional de-legitimization.20 For each 
of these three areas, this section will outline the 
various economic transmission mechanisms 
from the existing economic regimes and actual 
policies to their economic and political conse-
quences. 
Dependence
The above-described de jure and de facto eco-
nomic regimes and policies make the Palesti-
nian economy utterly dependent on Israel. This 
dependence can be seen at many levels. This 
section will briefly examine five of them –pro-
duction, trade, labor, fiscal revenues and elec-
tricity. Other areas of dependence worth exa-
mining, but beyond the purview of this paper 
are currency, banking system, private sector 
business ties, the health sector and the envi-
ronment. 21
20 This paper does not purport to analyze all factors af-
fecting the performance of the Palestinian economy or of 
Palestinian institutions. Rather, it focuses on one variable 
--the imposition of a liberal economic regime appropriate 
for peace-time relations among sovereign, rich, well-estab-
lished states on a mercantilist reality of war and occupation 
between two unequal parties.
21 Currently, the Palestinian economy makes use to a 
large extent of the shekel as its main currency. This neces-
sitates cooperation with Israeli Banks to work jointly with the 
Palestinian Monetary Authority on clearance arrangements. 
A future Palestinian state, on the other hand, may wish to 
establish its own currency. The Palestinian banking system, 
because of its heavy use of the shekel, is also dependent 
on clearance agreements with Israeli banks. This puts them 
in a dependent position, as has been evidenced in the cur-
rent crisis in Gaza. Many large Palestinian firms, such as 
some of the monopolies, include agreements with Israeli 
firms (upon which they are dependent). The health sector 
relies heavily on sending medical cases which cannot be 
treated in Palestine to Israel. Future planning may wish to 
explore alternative locations in Europe and the Arab world 
to lessen dependence on Israel. This would, of course, 
require the provision of the necessary funding from these 
countries. The Palestinian environment is also heavily de-
pendent on Israeli water management, sewerage and mil-
itary refuse treatment and disposal as well as on Israeli in-
dustrial practices. This area will necessitate regulation and 
management between the two parties on an equal footing 
well into the future.
The production capacity and productivity level 
of the Palestinian economy depend to a large 
extent on Israeli policies. A key factor of pro-
duction –land—is at the mercy of the Israeli 
Government and Israeli settlers. In part, this is 
because ownership and title issues in Pales-
tine continue to be problematic. Lands with a 
clear title are limited to area A (the area where 
the PA is in full civil and security control). They 
are very scarce and constitute only 18 percent 
of the West Bank. On the other hand, the final 
status of lands in areas B (area of joint control 
between the PA and the GoI) and C (area under 
the full control of the GoI) is uncertain. In addi-
tion, the title for these lands is generally una-
vailable (World Bank, 2007e: 69). However, it is 
unclear whether having a clear title would make 
a significant difference in slowing down the pro-
cess of land confiscation which has proceeded 
unabated throughout the past forty years of oc-
cupation. This ongoing process of confiscation 
has led to a decrease in the supply of land for 
the Palestinian economy –for either agricultural 
or industrial purposes—and has greatly increa-
sed its price (see below section on de-develo-
pment). Water availability and prices are also a 
constraint to the development and competitive-
ness of the Palestinian agricultural sector.
The Palestinian industrial sector is also great-
ly dependent on Israel. After 1967, a number 
of Palestinian micro-enterprises developed to 
form the low-value added part of manufactu-
ring chains integrated with an Israeli enterprise. 
In particular, Palestinian firms would sub-con-
tract for Israeli firms in sectors producing labor 
intensive goods like garments and footwear 
(World Bank, 2007e: 5). Because the Israeli 
economy is transitioning out of these low-value 
added manufacturing products, there is decrea-
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sing demand for Palestinian micro-enterprises 
sub-contracting in these sectors. In 2008 ma-
nufacturing output was nearly 20 percent and 
agricultural output 55 percent below their 1999 
levels (World Bank, 2009b: 11). The Palesti-
nian industrial sector is also dependent upon 
the Israeli economy in that a large number of 
Palestinian firms depend on Israeli firms for de-
veloping contacts with the outside world, inclu-
ding for marketing and exporting their products 
to third countries. This is in part because these 
contacts are more highly developed in Israel, 
but also because Israeli firms are at an advanta-
ge in dealing with the Israeli bureaucracy, inclu-
ding its export requirements and processes. As 
a result, under 10 percent of the manufacturing 
and IT sample of firms of the World Bank’s West 
Bank-Gaza Investment Climate Assessment 
sells directly to the international market while 
most of the remaining firms sell through Israeli 
companies (World Bank, 2007e: 29). 
Palestinian productivity is highly dependent on 
developments in Israel-Palestine relations and 
on the conflict in particular. Productivity growth 
is largely driven by the ability of firms to build 
scale economies through developing access 
to larger markets and the capacity of firms to 
learn and implement new production methods 
and techniques. Both of these possibilities are 
largely absent in Palestine as the conflict and 
its related myriad obstacles to movement and 
access increasingly reduce the market size of 
Palestinian firms and effectively cut them off 
from contacts with firms in Israel and the rest of 
the world. Therefore, one of the main channels 
through which growth is spurred in North-South 
regional integration arrangements –technolo-
gy-transfer—is not present in the Israeli-Pales-
tinian context. Like production, Palestinian pro-
ductivity growth also seems to have followed 
closely the avatars of the conflict. As a result, 
the overall productivity and labor productivity of 
Palestinian firms rose between 1997 and 2000, 
declined sharply in 2001 (ensuing the onset 
of the Intifada), and recovered by 2004 (World 
Bank, 2007e: 14-15, 73). 
The Palestinian economy is also greatly depen-
dent on the Israeli economy for its trade flows. 
This relationship of dependence is almost who-
lly one-sided. In 2003, Palestine’s imports from 
and exports to Israel accounted for 73 and 92 
percent of the total respectively (World Bank, 
2006a: 49). On the other hand, Israel’s trade 
with Palestine only accounted for about 1 per-
cent of Israel’s total imports and 6.3 percent of 
its exports (Arnon & Bamya, 2007: 193). Pales-
tinian exports are also dependent on Israel for 
access. Since there are no ports or airports in 
Palestine, exports can only go out through Is-
rael, Jordan or Egypt and Israel currently con-
trols all checkpoints and trade access routes. 
Also, because Palestinian cars and trucks are 
not allowed access into Israel, Palestinian firms 
depend on Israeli firms to transport their export 
goods into Israel and, for those with other fi-
nal destinations, onward to third countries. As 
a result, Palestinian trade flows totally depend 
on the state of the conflict with Israel and the 
degree of closure and other restrictions impo-
sed by the GoI at any given point in time. For 
example, Palestinian exports, after increasing 
by 4 percent in 1999, declined by 7, 35, 13 and 
4 percent respectively in the years 2000, 2001, 
2002 and 2003. Similarly, Palestinian imports 
increased by 19 percent in 1999 but declined 
by 14, 18 and 2 percent in 2000, 2001 and 2002 
and started growing by 5 percent again in 2003 
(International Monetary Fund, 2006: 8).
 Since the beginning of the occupation in 1967, 
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labor flows from Palestine to Israel have been 
one of the main sources of growth in the Pales-
tinian economy. They were also the main engine 
of income convergence during the first years of 
the occupation (Kleiman, 1999 as cited in Des-
sus, 2004: 4). Labor flows, however, have also 
been highly variable depending on the security 
situation and the decisions of the GoI and they 
declined sharply after the beginning of the se-
cond Intifada. The percentage of all employed 
Palestinians working in Israel fell from an ave-
rage of 16 percent in 1994-99 to 7 percent in 
2003-2005 (World Bank, 2006a: 2). This decli-
ne led to substantial losses to the Palestinian 
economy. For instance, the World Bank calcula-
tes that, based on the level  determined by the 
share of “Israeli” employment in total WBG em-
ployment in 1999-2000, the number of Palesti-
nian workers in Israel in 2005 could have been 
165,000 and their earnings USD 922 million. 
Instead, because of permit restrictions, em-
ployment was only 63,000 and earnings USD 
351 million. According to the same study, the 
estimated loss over 2001-05 because of lower 
employment amounted to USD 2.4 billion and 
because of closures to USD 928 million, with 
the total losses amounting to 3.3 billion USD.22 
By 2007, a man in the West Bank only had a 77 
percent chance of being employed compared 
to 1999 (World Bank, 2009b: 32).
Because the Palestinian economy is so closely 
linked to the Israeli economy, growth and gover-
nment revenues fluctuate with the cycles of the 
conflict. For instance, during the growth years of 
1995 to 1999, government revenues in US do-
llars almost doubled, going from US 510 million 
22 The ensuing losses to individual Palestinian workers 
are very high since wages earned in Israel are roughly two 
thirds higher than those earned in WBG (assuming there is 
a job available) (World Bank, 2006a: 20-21).
(15.8 percent of GDP) to US $ 942  million (22.6 
percent of GDP) (World Bank, 2007d: 6). On the 
other hand, the Intifada led to a steep decline 
in government revenues. By December 2000 –
three months into the Intifada--, revenues had 
declined by 50 percent relative to the pre-Inti-
fada level.23 Moreover, the Palestinian Authori-
ty is also dependent on Israel to collect on its 
behalf and transfer to it “clearance revenues,” 
which amount to roughly 60 percent of overall 
PA revenues. 
Despite its contravening the Oslo Accords, Is-
rael has repeatedly used the withholding of the-
se revenues as a political tool to place pressure 
on or to “punish” the Palestinian Authority. For 
instance, in 2001 (during the second intifada), 
the GoI suspended the regular transfer of clea-
rance revenue until December 2002. Similarly, 
in the second quarter of 2006, the GoI suspen-
ded revenue transfers to the PA due to the Ha-
mas electoral victory (and donors suspended 
budget support). Overall, in 2006, resources to 
fund recurrent budget expenditures fell by more 
than one third compared to the previous year. 
After the advent of the Salam Fayyad Govern-
ment, the GoI restarted the transfer of clearan-
ce revenue (including the retained funds from 
February 2006 to June 2007) and donor fun-
ding resumed. 
The energy sector is another area in which the 
Palestinian economy utterly depends on Israel. 
23 Although conflict reduces economic growth and gov-
ernment revenue in general, most of the decline in Palestine 
seems to be due to the close connection of the Palestinian 
economy to the Israeli economy. In particular, the World 
Bank estimates that: “The steep decline reflected tightened 
restrictions on the movement of goods in and out of the 
West Bank and Gaza, and cutbacks in Palestinian consum-
er spending, both of which reduced imports.” (World Bank, 
2007d: 6). 
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In particular, the PA depends on Israel for eighty 
percent of its electricity supply as well as for all 
petroleum imports (Arnon & Bamya, 2007: 168). 
Electricity imports from Israel into the West 
Bank and Gaza are supplied through the Israeli 
public power supply monopoly –the Israel Elec-
tricity Company (IEC). The IEC provides all the 
electricity supply used in the West Bank --ex-
cept for the recent connection of the Jericho 
area to Jordan.24 In Gaza, roughly 68 percent 
of electricity supply is provided directly by IEC 
while the 25 percent produced by the Gaza 
Power Plant also depends on Israel because 
the plant runs on gasoil imported from IEC. The 
remaining 7 percent of Gaza electricity supply 
is imported from Egypt. Because such a high 
percentage of Palestinian electricity supply co-
mes from an Israeli public monopoly and gets 
to Palestine physically through Israel, the Israeli 
government can disrupt the electricity supply to 
the West Bank and Gaza at any time. 
This dependency has had dire consequences 
on the financial management of the electricity 
sector, on actual electricity supply –especially 
in Gaza—and on overall strategic energy plan-
ning. Regarding financial management, the Is-
raeli Ministry of Finance systematically deducts 
from the tax revenues it collects on behalf of the 
24 This is a positive development whose replication is 
advised in the recommendations section of this paper. “The 
PA has agreed with Jordan to connect the Palestinian pow-
er grid to that of Jordan at Jericho through a 33kV line via 
King Abdallah Bridge. JDECO (Jerusalem District Electric-
ity Company) submitted a new request recently to upgrade 
the line to 132 kilovolt, which is compatible with the voltage 
supplied by the Jordanian electricity company. This con-
nection would not link the power grids of Israel and Jordan. 
JDECO will execute the work on the Palestinian side. The 
Jericho area will be disconnected from the Israeli power 
grid, and JDECO will manage a separate electricity supply 
system for the customers connected to the electricity sup-
ply from Jordan. The Israeli Ministries of National Infrastruc-
ture and Defence (Civil Administration) have approved this 
connection.” (World Bank, 2007c: 14). 
PA the amount owed to IEC by Palestinian elec-
tricity distribution companies and municipalities 
which are unable to/do not pay the IEC fully for 
its electricity supply. The total amount deducted 
for this concept from PA revenues amounted 
to more than 350 million USD since 2000. This 
payment collection system means that Palesti-
nian electricity distribution companies and mu-
nicipalities have weak incentives to collect pay-
ments from clients since any leftover amount 
will by default be passed on by the IEC to the 
PA. This perverse incentive system jointly with 
the ongoing economic crisis has led to an in-
creasing culture of non-payment25, weakening 
the sector’s financial management, placing a 
great burden on PA finances and straining the 
relationship between electricity distribution 
companies, municipalities and the PA.26 
This system also weakens institutional legiti-
macy and emphasizes the dependence of the 
PA on Israel. The PA has acknowledged this 
situation and taken action to redress the part 
that is within its power –attempting to improve 
collection rates from consumers and municipa-
lities. To this effect, it is working on introducing a 
system of (water and electricity) “payment certi-
ficates” that will be necessary to engage in any 
transactions with or receive payments from the 
PA (International Monetary Fund, 2008: 7). The 
PA has also started monitoring municipalities’ 
bank accounts to ensure that payments made 
25 This problem is particularly acute in Gaza due to the 
Israeli-imposed blockade. Currently, the collection rate of 
the Gaza electricity distribution company GEDCO is only 
around 25-30 percent. Status of GEDCO, 2008: p. 2.
26  The IMF estimates that “net lending” from the PA to 
the municipalities and electricity distribution companies 
“rose from NIS 1.5 billion (7.4 percent of GDP) in 2006 
to NIS 2.2 billion (10.6 percent of GDP) in 2007, as utili-
ty collection rates declined, and some municipalities used 
households’ utility payments to pay for other municipal ser-
vices.” (International Monetary Fund, 2008: 8).
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by consumers are indeed transferred to su-
ppliers. On their side, some electricity distribu-
tion companies such as GEDCO are planning 
to introduce pre-paid meters to increase their 
collection rates. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of the po-
tential consequences of Palestinian dependen-
ce on energy supply from Israel is the current 
energy crisis in Gaza. Since the 2006 Hamas 
electoral victory, Israel has imposed a blocka-
de on the Strip. As has been documented by 
aid relief organizations and donor agencies, 
this blockade has had a disastrous impact on 
the economy of the Gaza Strip and hence on 
the living conditions of the population. In the 
energy sector, the blockade has led to a sha-
rp reduction in electricity supply. Israel has the 
means to implement this reduction both becau-
se the electricity supply to the Strip –except for 
7 percent which comes from Egypt27-- and the 
fuel for the Gaza Power Plant come from Israel 
and because Israel controls entry and exit into 
Gaza. In September 2008, the Gaza Electricity 
Distribution Company (GEDCO) calculated the 
energy deficit to be at 15 percent and it forecas-
ted it to rise to 25 percent in the winter-time.28 
This electricity supply deficit has led to intermit-
tent power cuts with a heavy impact on industry, 
sewerage treatment plants and hospitals. 
Moreover, the Gaza Power Plant warehouse is 
experiencing a shortage of basic electrical ma-
terials needed for system maintenance such 
as transformers, cables and fuses. Many of 
these materials have been purchased and do-
27 Status of GEDCO, 2008: Table 1. “Sources of Energy 
and Deficit.”
28 Status of GEDCO, 2008: Table 1. “Sources of Energy 
and Deficit.”
nated and have been waiting in Israel and the 
West Bank for transport into the Strip for over 
six months. The GoI, however, has denied all 
applications submitted by the Palestinian Ener-
gy Authority for security permission to transport 
them into Gaza. The absence of spare parts 
has led to the inability of GEDCO to carry out 
even basic maintenance work on its network –
including in such sensitive areas as water wells, 
sewage stations and hospitals. Lacking mainte-
nance constitutes a high risk of injury and death 
accidents to the population and is likely to affect 
electricity supply in the future.29 It also contribu-
tes to heavy network losses, which are currently 
estimated at around 30 percent. Sewage leaka-
ges have already been a problem for some time 
and are polluting the waters in Northern Gaza, 
endangering the lives of the Bedouin popula-
tion there.30 Overall, the Gaza energy crisis un-
derscores the dire consequences of the total 
dependence of Palestine on Israel for electricity 
supply as well as the urgency to diversify elec-
tricity supplies toward own generation and pur-
chases from Jordan and Egypt. 
Moreover, the current system of electricity su-
pply through the IEC does not properly suit 
Palestinian needs. As has been noted by the 
Aix Group, there are problems of quantity and 
price of electricity supply as well as voltage. In 
order for municipalities to increase the amount 
of electricity they purchase from the IEC, they 
need to pay it large fees and the IEC does not 
even respond to this increase in demand unless 
it has extra supply in its transmission lines. In 
addition, priority in service is given to the Israe-
li customer, leaving the end of feeder lines in 
29 World Bank sector mission notes. November 2008.
30 Letter dated November 5th, 2008 from GEDCO to the 
World Bank. 
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Palestine with low voltage which often results in 
electricity cutoffs during grid maintenance ope-
rations (Arnon & Bamya, 2007: 170).
Finally, all petroleum imports into Palestine are 
managed by a Palestinian monopoly (the Pa-
lestinian Petroleum Commission), which in turn 
buys fuel from a single Israeli supplier.31 This 
two-sided monopoly increases the energy de-
pendence of Palestine on Israel and prevents 
the PA and private Palestinian companies from 
exploring alternative sources of energy supply. 
Options for increasing energy autonomy will be 
discussed in the recommendations section at 
the end of this paper.  
De-development
Sara Roy characterized the economic trajec-
tory of the Palestinian economy since its occu-
pation by Israel in 1967 as “de-development.” 
She defines this process as one dominated by 
expropriation, integration and de-institutionali-
zation and substantiates it in developments oc-
curring up to the year 1999. 32 This sub-section 
will attempt to elucidate whether this process of 
de-development has continued after the year 
2000. To do so, it will track six economic trans-
mission mechanisms which link the de facto 
economic regime described above with its ac-
tual economic consequences. These economic 
transmission mechanisms are: wages, land and 
electricity prices, transport costs, isolation from 
the outside world and fragmentation of the in-
ternal economic space. 
31 “The Israeli company Dor Alon was the sole company 
chosen by the Palestinians to supply oil products for West 
Bank and Gaza from 1994 until the end of 2006. Starting 
from January 2007, the largest fuel marketing company in 
Israel – Paz Oil - was chosen by the PA to supply the product 
requirements of the West Bank.” (World Bank, 2007c: 12).
32 See, for instance, Roy (1999).
Wages--The (relative) integration of the Pales-
tinian economy into the Israeli economy which 
took place after 1967 bid up Palestinian wages 
(and overall prices) to levels well above those 
of countries at comparable stages of develop-
ment. For instance, the average wage of a Pa-
lestinian production worker is about twice that 
of a Jordanian worker and almost three times 
an Egyptian’s (World Bank, 2007e: iii). Howe-
ver, due to the special circumstances of conflict 
and occupation (such as low levels of public 
and private investment and reduced scope for 
enterprise learning and technology transfers), 
Palestinian productivity levels did not go up 
by enough to compensate for wage increases. 
Dessus (2004) finds that, between 1968 and 
2000, rising productivity in Palestine only mar-
ginally contributed to GDP growth, which was 
mainly fueled by factor accumulation. For the 
2000-2004 period productivity increased, but 
not by enough to keep up with rising costs and 
international competition (World Bank, 2007e: 
14-15). In fact, the average wage productivity in 
Palestinian industry is only 57 percent of Egypt’s 
and 85 percent of Israel’s. In specific –particu-
larly labor-intensive—sectors, competitiveness 
gaps are even starker. For instance, Palestinian 
wage productivity in the food processing indus-
try is only 66 percent of Egypt’s and 41 percent 
of Turkey’s while, in the wearing apparel sector, 
Jordan’s wage productivity is triple and Egypt’s 
and Turkey’s nearly double that of Palestine. As 
a result, in many areas, Palestinian workers are 
not competitive with the rest of the world. (World 
Bank, 2007e: 16). 
Land and Electricity Prices--Over the past for-
ty years, there has been a continuing process 
of confiscation of Palestinian land by the GoI. 
As a result, the availability of remaining land in 
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Palestine is low and its price is very high. Land 
suitable for industrial development in Ramallah 
costs from $100 to over $200 per square me-
ter, levels which are comparable to those of pri-
me real-estate in major European cities (World 
Bank, 2007e: 47). Similarly, the average cost of 
serviced land in Palestine is roughly three times 
the cost of land in Egypt and five times the cost 
in Jordan (World Bank, 2006a: 69). As a result, 
the World Bank’s 2007 Investment Climate As-
sessment finds that Palestinian businessmen 
view the availability of serviced land as a major 
constraint to developing new businesses and 
expanding existing ones (World Bank, 2007e: 
47). The current restricted framework through 
which energy supply decisions are being made 
has also led to a supply shortage and soaring 
electricity prices. In the year 2000, the average 
price of electricity in Palestine was twice as high 
as in Lebanon, three times higher than in Israel 
and Jordan and five times the price in the USA 
(Arnon & Bamya, 2007: 169).
Transport Costs--Transport costs are a further 
contributor to de-development. After uncer-
tainty, transportation is cited by Palestinian 
businessmen as the most important constraint 
to the expansion of the private sector (World 
Bank, 2007e: 38). Israel requires that Palesti-
nian trucks use the “back-to-back” system ac-
cording to which all goods need to be unloaded 
from and re-loaded again onto trucks at chec-
kpoints. Moreover, routes are now much longer 
due to the blocking of some roads to Palesti-
nians and the multiplication of checkpoints. As 
a result, the World Bank estimates that a truck 
that was able to make three rotations per day 
before the Intifada, now makes only two. All of 
these obstacles have significantly raised unit 
transportation costs. By restricting access to 
major West Bank cities such as Nablus, Rama-
llah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem or Jenin, closures 
have dramatically raised transportation costs 
within the West Bank. On the basis of interviews 
with drivers of two major Ramallah-based com-
panies, the World Bank estimates that transport 
costs alone have gone up by more than 100 
percent along major trading routes compared to 
pre-Intifada times. Similarly, a one week closure 
in Gaza leads to an estimated four-fold increase 
in transportation costs for a furniture producer 
as importers and exporters need to pay extra 
fees for shipments stuck at the terminal. These 
extra costs amount to 77 percent of the value 
added in the Gaza Strip. Prolonged closures 
are particularly damaging. During prolonged 
closures, importers and exporters from Gaza 
experienced an almost tenfold increase in the 
cost of transport from the port of Ashdod in Is-
rael to Gaza compared to the cost before the 
Intifada (World Bank, 2006a: 29-30). 
Another major factor increasing the cost of 
transport is unpredictability. The degree of un-
certainty on the time needed to clear customs, 
for example, is very high. The 2007 World Bank 
Investment Climate Assessment survey reveals 
that, on average, it takes companies in the West 
Bank around 22 days to clear imports. However, 
the longest time averages nearly 43 days (World 
Bank, 2007e: iv). This variability and uncertain-
ty in time lags greatly increases transportation 
costs. In the case of maritime transport, a stan-
dard deviation of 20 percent of transport time 
increases transportation costs by nearly 45 per-
cent (World Bank, 2006a: 21). 
Isolation from the Outside World--Because of 
the multiplication of barriers to movement and 
access, the Palestinian economy is becoming 
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increasingly closed and inward-looking. Trade 
between Palestine and the rest of the world, be-
tween Palestine and Israel, between the West 
Bank and Gaza, and within the West Bank have 
all declined. Between 1999 and 2006, Pales-
tinian exports declined from 19 to 12 percent 
of GDP while imports declined from 84 to 79 
percent of GDP (International Monetary Fund, 
2006: 8). Similarly, between 1999 and 2003, Pa-
lestinian exports to Israel declined from 359 to 
256 million USD while Palestinian imports from 
Israel fell from 1853 to 1307 million USD (World 
Bank, 2006a: 41). 
Fragmentation of the Internal Economic Spa-
ce--Even before the closure of Gaza in 2006, 
movement of people and goods between the 
West Bank and Gaza was severely hampered 
and the corridor between the two areas was 
not operational. The situation worsened at the 
beginning of the Intifada and the World Bank’s 
Investment Climate Assessment finds that, sin-
ce 2000, the percentage of WBG enterprises 
selling into the other territory has fallen by half 
(World Bank, 2007e: iv). 
Moreover, because of the combined impact of 
impediments to trade and economic activity wi-
thin the West Bank, the size of markets inside 
the West Bank itself also appears to be shrin-
king. One could say that there is a de facto “frag-
mentation of the socio-economic space in the 
West Bank into a northern, a central and a sou-
thern economic zone, bounded on three sides 
by the separation barrier and to the west by the 
Jordan Valley, a significant agricultural area that 
is increasingly difficult for Palestinians to ac-
cess” (World Bank, 2007e: 25). As a result, the 
percentage of Palestinian firms making a sig-
nificant share of their sales outside their home 
city declined from nearly 60 percent in 2000 to 
around 40 percent in 2005 (World Bank, 2007e: 
v). Because of this internal fragmentation of 
the economic space, which is reflected in lar-
ge price differentials across areas, there is no 
longer a unified market within the West Bank.33 
This dramatic reduction in market size severely 
reduces economic opportunity and affects the 
ability of Palestinian firms to take advantage of 
scale economies. 
7. The Economic Consequences of 
Dependence
The economic transmission mechanisms des-
cribed above--wage growth outstripping pro-
ductivity growth, over-inflated land prices, high 
transportation costs and uncertainty in delivery 
times and an increasingly autarkic and interna-
lly fragmented economy-- combine to produ-
ce a host of negative economic effects which 
will be presented below. These effects are: low 
investment, de-industrialization and overall 
weakening of the productive structure and de-
ficiencies in firm capacity. 
Low Investment--Private, public and total in-
vestment have declined almost consistently 
between 1999 and 2006. Over this time period, 
total investment as a percentage of GDP was 
halved, going from 38 to 19 percent. Private in-
vestment fell from 31 to 15 percent and public 
investment from 7 to 4 percent of GDP (Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 2006:8). Moreover, in 
2006, only 50 percent of firms in the West Bank 
and 25 percent of those in Gaza were investing 
33 As a result, the differences between the highest and 
lowest retail prices of agricultural commodities, for instance, 
are high –for tomatoes, eggplant, squash, cucumbers and 
bell peppers it ranged between 400 percent and 215 per-
cent. (World Bank, 2006a: 31).
Fadi Kattan
Rosa Alonso 
81Revista Internacional de Cooperación y Desarrollo Vol. 3 No. 2 | Año 2016 | PP. 59-98
and only 35 percent of West Bank firms and 15 
percent of Gaza firms were investing in con-
ducting formal personnel training (World Bank, 
2007e: 18). Similarly, only 18 percent of firms 
had a loan (World Bank, 2007e: 39). The World 
Bank’s 2007 Investment Climate Assessment 
found that “the fact that very few businesses 
have loans reflects not the lack of available 
funds or a weak financial system, but rather the 
lack of investment opportunities for Palestinian 
enterprises.” It also pointed out that there is no 
need to invest because existing capacity utiliza-
tion is very low –only 50 percent. (World Bank, 
2007e: 40, iii). 
De-industrialization--Sara Roy (1999) pointed 
out the weakening of the Palestinian productive 
structure induced by the context and policies 
of the occupation and called the trend de-de-
velopment. The trend of a declining share of 
industry in GDP which she identified for the 
1995 to 2000 period seems to have peaked at 
the height of the “integration” between the Pa-
lestinian and the Israeli economies. In fact, be-
tween 1995 and 2000, the share of agriculture 
and manufacturing in GDP declined from 13 to 
9 and from 18 to 13 percent respectively. The 
sectors that took up the slack from agriculture 
and manufacturing were services and, in parti-
cular, real estate and “other services.” 
On the other hand, following the relative 
“de-coupling” between the two economies sin-
ce the onset of the second Intifada in 2000, the 
sectoral distribution of the Palestinian economy 
seems to have stabilized. Between 2000 and 
2005, the shares of agriculture and manufactu-
ring in GDP increased slightly, going from 9 to 
10 and from 13 to 14 percent respectively. As 
a result of this slight recovery as well as an in-
crease in construction as a percent of GDP, the 
(over-inflated) share of services in GDP over 
the same period declined from 48 to 45 percent 
(World Bank, 2006a: 4 Table 2). However, the 
closure of Gaza since 2006 has led to a dra-
matic decline in its industrial production. Since 
producers can access neither the inputs for 
production nor the crossings to send out what 
they produce, the number of industrial working 
establishments in the Strip has declined by 95 
percent, going from 3900 in 2005 to 195 in De-
cember 2007. (World Bank, 2007a). 
Although with the relative “de-coupling” from the 
Israeli economy since 2000 the decline in in-
dustry (and agriculture) as a share of GDP has 
been halted, the accompanying trend toward a 
more autarkic economy has led to a simplifica-
tion of the productive structure. In the manufac-
turing sector, for instance, most exports are low 
value added goods that require little processing 
and the overall composition of exports reflects 
a very low and unsophisticated manufacturing 
base. It also indicates the lack of participation in 
intra-industry or intra-product trade. For instan-
ce, the fall in the share of processed food and 
textiles in exports and the rising share of stone, 
marble and quarrying from 2000 to 2005 sug-
gest that exports are becoming more resour-
ce-based and embody decreasing degrees of 
processing (World Bank, 2007e: 17). The World 
Bank’s latest Country Economic Memorandum 
for the West Bank and Gaza finds that:
“The trend of progressive deindustrialization of 
WBG continued in 2003 to 2005 as the economy 
moved toward goods at lower levels of the tech-
nology ladder and imports of food products lar-
gely crowded out imports of investment goods. 
The level of processing embodied in exports as 
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captured by the aggregate share of food products 
together with industrial raw materials recently de-
clined significantly. Similarly, a shift in import de-
mand toward lower processed goods and the fall 
in investment goods which have accompanied 
the overall decline in total imports suggest a fur-
ther erosion of the industrial base” (World Bank, 
2006a: iii). 
In agriculture, Roy (1999) pointed out a decline 
in the share of high value added products for 
export and a turn toward basic foodstuffs for do-
mestic consumption (potatoes, onions, tomato-
es). Since 2000, agricultural exports have not 
increased as declines in the production of some 
products compensated for increases in others. 
(World Bank, 2006b: 27 – 47). Overall, a recent 
World Bank study finds the agricultural sector 
to be particularly resilient to closures and other 
movement and access restrictions. This is con-
sistent, however, with a versatile sector which 
can turn from exports to catering to the domes-
tic market depending on movement and access 
restrictions. In addition, the study pre-dates the 
closure of Gaza, which must have led to a sharp 
decline in agricultural exports from the Strip. 
Moreover, the increasing isolation of the Pales-
tinian economy from the rest of the world (in-
cluding Israel) has led to a stagnation in firm 
size and enterprise learning. In fact, in 2006, 
the average firm size in Palestine was about 4 
workers, the same as it was in 1927, and only 
21 industrial establishments had more than 100 
workers (World Bank, 2009b: 1, 19) This small 
firm size combined with limited access to enter-
prise learning help explain the fact that only a 
small share of industrial firms have internatio-
nal quality standards (World Bank, 2007e: iii), 
which greatly limits their market and export po-
tential. 
The above-described de-development process 
has had a greatly deleterious effect on the wel-
fare of the Palestinian population. This impact 
can be seen in terms of income per capita and 
poverty levels as well as in employment and 
unemployment trends. Real income per capi-
ta in 2005 remained about 30 percent below 
its pre-Intifada level and it was expected to be 
about 27 percent below its 2000 level in 2011 
(World Bank, 2009b: 11). According to the 2007 
Household Survey, poverty was at 30 percent 
in Gaza and 19 percent in the West Bank. The 
overall employment level, which had fallen by 
23 percent between 1999 and 2002, only re-
covered its pre-Intifada level by 2005. Similarly, 
the unemployment rate rose from 12 to 35 per-
cent between 1999 and 2002. Due to popula-
tion growth, however, even by 2006, unemplo-
yment had not recovered its pre-Intifada level 
and it stood at 24 percent (35 percent in Gaza 
and 17 percent in the West Bank) (International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2006; World 
Bank, 2009b). By 2008, unemployment had 
continued to rise and it stood at 40 percent in 
Gaza and 19 percent in the West Bank (World 
Bank, 2009b: 10).
Institutional de-legitimization
This section will argue that the current institu-
tional framework for economic relations be-
tween Palestine and Israel fosters –but does 
not create-- neo-patrimonial rent-seeking be-
havior and slows down the development of the 
legitimacy and independence of Palestinian 
institutions, with adverse implications for a fu-
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ture Palestinian state.34 It will also argue that it 
is within the power of the PA to improve gover-
nance and, to a certain extent, take measures 
to enhance economic autonomy even within 
the difficult context of the occupation and the 
unsupportive framework of the Paris Protocol. 
The first sub-section will analyze the governan-
ce situation in the 1990s. In particular, it will set 
out the patterns of neo-patrimonial rent-seeking 
behavior supported by the Paris Protocol, the 
emergence of those patterns even in contexts 
independent from the Paris Protocol and the re-
sulting perception of PA corruption in the eyes 
of the Palestinian public. It will finish by briefly 
examining the likely impact of the dependence 
of Palestinian institutions and the Palestinian 
economy on Israel on the popular credibility 
of the PA. The second sub-section will turn to 
describing the political economy that underli-
ned the governance situation of the 1990s and 
how this system was increasingly resented by 
the Palestinian population and was shaken by 
the second Intifada starting in 2002 and the 
election of the Hamas government in 2006. The 
third and final sub-section will describe how the 
new government of Salam Fayyad is working 
to improve governance while still operating wi-
thout the required autonomy in a fragile political 
economy environment which is very different 
from that prevailing in the 1990s. 
34 Our argument will be that the Paris agreements and 
the constellation of political economy forces existing with-
in and between Israel and Palestine created incentives for 
neo-patrimonial rent-seeking behavior. However, this result 
is not deterministic and can be altered even in the current 
circumstances. This is supported by the fact that, when 
the PA has decided to tackle corruption and improve gov-
ernance in a number of areas –as it increasingly did since 
2002 and even more so since 2007--, it has been success-
ful in doing so. It is also corroborated by the fact that many 
cases of neo-patrimonial behavior –such as the rent-seek-
ing or wasta involved in PA participation in many Palestinian 
private enterprises—did not in any way involve the Govern-
ment of Israel or Israeli companies.
PA Governance in the 1990s
The Paris Protocol supported rent-seeking 
behavior through two main avenues. The first 
is the financial management system and, in 
particular, the tax collection system it devised. 
The second is the network of public and private 
monopolies it legitimized. Until the 2002 refor-
ms, tax revenues from excises on petroleum, 
tobacco and alcohol, as well as profits from 
public enterprises were deposited directly into 
private accounts outside the purview of the Mi-
nistry of Finance. Moreover, the 1995 Invest-
ment Promotion Code provided the executive 
with wide and unspecified discretionary power 
to grant exceptional tax exemptions to large 
projects.35 The dangers to good governance 
posed by such policies were pointed out ear-
ly on by international donor agencies.36 These 
arrangements, however, were approved and 
condoned by Israel (who deposited funds di-
rectly into private rather than PA accounts) and 
the diplomatic community.37 This has now been 
openly acknowledged, including by the World 
Bank: “At the beginning of the Oslo process…
several risky compromises were accepted by 
the diplomatic community. The first of these was 
the creation of a Palestinian financial system 
35 These policies were part of the Law of Encourage-
ment of Investment passed in 1995 and modified in 1998. 
“Critics argued that the law was not effective because it 
ignored small-scale businesses, which represented the 
majority of Palestinian enterprises. It was claimed that the 
Law was biased toward large firms and thus promoted mo-
nopolies for politically influential groups in the Palestinian 
economy.” (Khan, Giacaman & Amundsen, 2004: 176).
36  See, for instance, Chua, D. (1998).
37 The bet of the international community in the 1990s 
was that they needed to support President Arafat at any 
cost. The cost, however, ended up being the disenchant-
ment of the Palestinian population and growing support for 
Hamas culminating in its 2006 electoral victory. The diplo-
matic community was also wary of holding the PA account-
able since it was unwilling to hold Israel accountable –for 
its part in implementing the Oslo agreements as well as for 
continuing settlement expansion.
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featuring certain opaque elements that could 
operate beneath any “radar screen” of public 
accountability, and would offer President Ara-
fat what was referred to by some diplomats as 
“walkabout money” with which to secure politi-
cal loyalties.” (Roberts, 2002: 19).  Whether this 
money was siphoned off or simply used for pu-
blic PA or PLO purposes beyond public scrutiny, 
the fact remains that the system did not comply 
with any basic standards of transparency and 
accountability.
Regarding the role of public monopolies, much 
remains to be explored at the analytical level 
and tackled at the policy level. The facts are 
that the PA granted monopolistic concessions 
to private investors in large infrastructure pro-
jects, such as telecommunications and electri-
city, which were accused of being awarded in a 
non-transparent manner, were poorly regulated 
and often resulted in high profits for providers, 
high costs for customers and entry barriers to 
other potential Palestinian entrepreneurs. In the 
area of telecommunications, a single company, 
PALTEL, was granted a 20-year license to ope-
rate, maintain and manage the telecommuni-
cations sector in Palestine. PALTEL has been 
subject to heavy criticism, including of abuse 
of monopoly power and clientelism. World Bank 
studies substantiate these claims and have ca-
lled for an opening up of the sector to competi-
tion. A 2008 report describes the sector as be-
ing characterized by “the presence of a private 
regulated monopoly, unauthorized competition 
(from Israel), and overall weak governance and 
regulation” and calls for the urgent liberalization 
and improvement in regulation of the sector 
(World Bank, 2008).
The PA also monopolized imports and distribu-
tion of cement and petroleum. The monopolies 
in the import of petroleum and cement were es-
tablished in cooperation with Israeli firms. In the 
case of the cement sector, it seems that large 
business interests on both sides coalesced to 
form the Palestinian import monopoly and its re-
lationship to the Israeli monopoly Nesher Com-
pany. Indeed, “the PNA cement monopoly has 
been criticized not only because it eliminated 
competition and raised costs for the vital cons-
truction sector, but also because it created a 
powerful coalition against the development of a 
Palestinian cement industry” (Khan et al., 2004: 
185). All of the above-described monopolies 
were institutionalized by the Paris Protocol.
As mentioned above, however, there were ca-
ses in which rent-seeking was unconnected 
to the Paris Protocol or to Israel. For example, 
the PA went into business partnerships with 
private firms in sectors which do not warrant 
government intervention, such as hotels, casi-
nos, cigarettes and flour milling. In these areas, 
moreover, there was no relationship to Israe-
li firms nor were the interventions reflected in 
the Paris Protocol. As it is now acknowledged, 
“each of these strategies involved discrimina-
tory support for large firms.” (Khan et al., 2004: 
176). This is also the perception of Palestinian 
businessmen. A 2005 Survey conducted by the 
Center for Private Sector Development of the 
Palestinian Businessmen Association found 
that “Palestinian entrepreneurs still perceive a 
degree of corruption in the PA and insufficient 
transparency of its activities. The major issues 
of concern by businessmen encompass the 
PA’s direct involvement in commercial activities 
(for example, fuel, cement, cigarettes) and the 
lack of progress with promised gradual with-
drawal.” (World Bank, 2006: 65) A World Bank 
survey also found that, in 11 percent of cases, 
respondents “claimed that a government agen-
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cy or official had asked for part ownership of 
their firm as a condition to allow them to ope-
rate.”(Khan et al., 2004: 182). Similarly, a 1997 
Palestinian Legislative Council report denoun-
ced that a large number of firms either totally 
or partially owned by the PA did not have their 
revenues collected through the government bu-
dget nor were they audited by the Palestinian 
Public Monitoring and Audit Department. 38 As 
a result of all these opaque fiscal and regulatory 
practices, the PA was perceived by the Pales-
tinian population as increasingly corrupt.39 By 
2004, polls found that 84 percent of Palesti-
nians perceived there to be corruption and 94 
percent believed that one could obtain a gover-
nment position only through connections (Bry-
nen, 2002: 137).  
The PA was not only perceived as corrupt, but 
also as not autonomous and not credible. The 
fact that the Oslo process created the first Pa-
lestinian government in history has been hai-
led by many as a success in and of itself. For 
instance, Kimmerling and Migdal (2003) view it 
thus: “The Oslo process created the first ever 
Palestinian government…Sometimes that go-
vernance was surprisingly effective; most times, 
it was frustratingly inefficient, even corrupt. Still, 
it consisted of Palestinians ruling Palestinians” 
(pp. 346-347). 
Because this first government was a govern-
ment without a state and a government that was 
utterly dependent –and designed to be depen-
38 These firms included the Petroleum Public Commis-
sion, Al-Bahar Company, the Tobacco Commission, Pales-
tinian Commercial Services Company, the Radio and Tele-
vision Commission and the Palestinian National Company 
for Economic Development. (Khan et al., 2004: 180).
39  See the Jerusalem Media and Communications Cen-
ter, the Development Studies Program at Birzeit University 
and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 
for examples. Keating 20.
dent—on Israel, its credibility was questioned 
from the outset.40 Surveys show that Palesti-
nians consider independence as the highest 
national priority (34 percent), well ahead of na-
tional unity (26.5 percent) and economic pros-
perity (16.5 percent) (Brynen, 2002: 133). The-
re is also a tendency by sectors of Palestinian 
intellectuals to view close economic integration 
with Israel as a form of neo-colonization.41 The-
refore, the uneven “economic integration” and 
dependence which was institutionalized by 
the Oslo process as described in the previous 
sections could easily be seen to corroborate 
these fears. Moreover, international experien-
ce shows that the gap between the PA’s de jure 
and de facto institutional frameworks is likely 
to further erode its credibility, weakening pros-
pects for healthy institution-building well into 
the future.42 Last but not least, the perceived 
dependence and “pliability” of the PA to Israel –
40 For a description of the development of the PA as “cli-
ent state” resulting from an “asymmetric containment strat-
egy” fostered by Israel, see Khan et al. (2004).
41 “…elements of the Palestinian leadership and social 
elite, like others in neighboring Arab countries, feared such 
an approach (economic integration) and viewed it as a sort 
of economic colonization, which would replace direct Israe-
li military rule in the region with indirect technological and 
economic control.” (Kimmerling & Migdal, 2003: 387).
42 Gaps between de jure and de facto institutional struc-
tures are common in developing countries, in particular in 
colonial and post-colonial environments –such as those 
of Africa and Latin America. In these continents, the first 
“modern” legal framework their populations ever knew was 
that of the colonial power. The second was that set up af-
ter independence by elites which often imported a de jure 
framework from the colonial power, but proceeded to op-
erate through de facto policy processes which greatly dif-
fered from their formal legal frameworks. This disconnect 
between formal (de jure) and informal (de facto) institutions 
and policies gravely eroded the credibility and legitimacy 
of the state in Africa and Latin America. In contrast, state 
legitimacy and credibility is much higher in regions which 
have had the “historical luxury” of developing their institu-
tions unencumbered by colonialism, such as most of Asia. 
In such countries, the correspondence between de jure and 
de facto institutions is much closer because formal insti-
tutions reflect the outcome of an endogenous process of 
political development.
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de jure as institutionalized in the Oslo and Paris 
accords and de facto in its policies and those 
of the Israeli government—not only weakened 
the PA, but also strengthened the standing of 
Hamas, which increasingly presented itself as 
the only truly autonomous option from Israel.43  
The Political Economy of the 1990s 
and its crisis
This political economy scenario characterized 
by poor governance, dependence, and eroding 
credibility was the result of the coalescence of a 
series of forces prevailing in Palestine and Israel 
in the 1990s. One could argue that the result of 
this confluence of forces was over-determined 
in that each one factor alone was sufficient to 
explain the ultimate outcome and, hence, that it 
is hard to ascertain which one of them was the 
determining cause. In one analysis, the histori-
cal tradition of neo-patrimonialism in Palestine 
(since the time of the Ottoman Empire carried 
through by the British, the Jordanians and the 
Israelis) and of the PLO in exile could be seen 
as simply resulting in its transposition to the PA. 
In a second analysis, it could be argued that the 
confluence of a strong occupying state (Israel) 
with a weak occupied non-state naturally led to 
the wish of the former to create a client country 
in the latter (Palestine).44 These objective con-
43 Recent polls, however, show that popular support for 
Hamas since it actually took power in Gaza has declined 
dramatically as the population experienced the worsen-
ing living conditions resulting from the Israeli blockade of 
the strip, Hamas repression and declining security due to 
Hamas-Fatah in-fighting. 83 percent of Gazans believe liv-
ing conditions have deteriorated since Hamas took power 
(Near East Consulting, 2007). The same polls also show a 
concomitant decline of support for the peace process. 
44 As Shimon Peres (1993) argued in The New Middle 
East, “A separate Palestinian state would be received with 
unease, either overtly or covertly, among Jordanians, and 
would face fierce opposition from Israelis.” (p. 175) There-
ditions would explain the desire and ability of 
Israel to create a weak and dependent econo-
mic and political elite in Palestine supported by 
the unnecessary and ill-regulated monopolies 
that are reflected in the Paris Protocol and by 
the Israeli forbearance and even support for the 
web of financial irregularities that emerged in 
the 1990s. 
It can also be argued that what emerged was 
truly the result of the combination of all of the-
se factors. 45 In this view, a few well-organized 
actors with good channels of communication 
between them --–the PLO elites, the wealthy 
Palestinian diaspora businessmen, the Gover-
nment of Israel and Israeli big business—coo-
perated to create the above-described arrange-
ments. These arrangements did not serve well 
the interests of the Palestinian –and arguably 
the Israeli—populations, but did create benefits 
for those participating --the Palestinian dias-
pora and Israeli firms through their business 
profits, the PLO elite through concentration of 
power and economic benefits, the Israeli gover-
nment by creating a dependent “client” non-sta-
te in Palestine.  
As the 1990s proceeded, however, the Pales-
tinian population became increasingly frus-
trated. The economy stagnated, there was no 
progress in the peace process and settlement 
expansion continued unabated. Moreover, res-
trictions to movement and access to Israel as 
fore, he proposes a confederation with Jordan with a demil-
itarized West Bank and Gaza “except for the Israeli security 
areas.”  (p.173) The fact that this was the political vision 
proposed by Peres in 1993 would support the view that the 
creation of economic dependence through Oslo was delib-
erate and part of a broader plan of creating a dependent 
Palestinian non-state. Whether this entity would be under 
Israeli or Jordanian tutelage was of secondary importance.
45 For a description of these various interpretations, see 
Brynen (1995a).
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well as between and within the West Bank and 
Gaza multiplied and were highly unpredictable 
making the daily life of the population as well 
as any business activity increasingly difficult. 
Many of the provisions of the Oslo accord were 
not implemented and the population started 
to doubt if they ever would be. It also became 
increasingly clear that the PA would no longer 
be able to ignore the new emerging centers 
of power in Palestinian society –the educated 
and organized poor in villages and, especially, 
in refugee camps and their grass-roots orga-
nizations, the new intellectual elites from the 
universities and their NGOs, and the emerging 
Islamic movement. Finally, any expectations for 
“good governance” that the Palestinian popula-
tion may have entertained from its leaders were 
badly disappointed. It was in this context that 
the second intifada erupted in the year 2000. As 
described by Kimmerling and Migdal (2003):
“The Al-Aqsa intifada directed discontent not only 
at the Israeli occupation but also toward the ineffi-
ciency, corruption, and authoritarian rule of the 
PA and its inability to bring about the expected 
economic development, rise in the standard of 
living, and true liberation from Israeli occupation. 
The uprising also brought growing dissatisfaction 
with Arafat’s leadership into the open.” (p. 393). 
The Intifada was a turning point. In the future, 
neither the PA nor the diplomatic community 
would be able to ignore the Palestinian popu-
lation the way it had been ignored during the 
years of the Oslo process. Moreover, a new 
class of Palestinian intellectuals and professio-
nals as well as grass-roots activists which had 
emerged at Palestinian universities and beco-
me active during the first intifada also challen-
ged PLO dominance in the political arena while 
the specter of Hamas lurked in the background 
ready to bank on any and all real and perceived 
PA failures. At the same time and at the interna-
tional level, the donor community had undergo-
ne a process through which “good governance” 
and, in particular, good financial management 
had been put to the forefront. With this confluen-
ce of new forces, the “gentlemen’s agreement” 
of the 1990s between PLO elites, the diploma-
tic community and the government of Israel was 
no longer viable. Most prominently, it would no 
longer be possible to sweep PA financial mis-
management under the rug for political expe-
diency. Finally, many governments in the Arab 
world were coming under increasing pressure 
by Islamic movements which used as fuel the 
ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a result, 
these governments stopped viewing the conti-
nuation of the conflict –which had been used for 
decades as a diversion of public attention from 
their internal failures-- as being in their interest. 
On the contrary, they realized that an effective, 
secular and moderate Palestinian leadership 
that was able to bring about an end to the Israe-
li occupation would be a great contribution to 
maintaining their own internal stability.
This change in the constellation of political eco-
nomy forces at the beginning of the new century 
led to the beginning of the implementation of re-
forms in the PA. Most prominently, some of the 
worst abuses in public finance management 
were eliminated. Between 2000 and 2004, the 
PA implemented a series of important public fi-
nance management reforms. These reforms in-
cluded the establishment of a Central Treasury 
Account through which all revenues are collec-
ted and all payments are made (and the con-
comitant elimination of side accounts leading 
to the diversion of funds). The PA also started 
formulating an annual budget approved by the 
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Palestinian Legislative Council and which forms 
the basis for expenditures throughout the year. 
It established tight controls on the expenditures 
of government ministries, transferred payroll 
responsibilities to the Ministry of Finance, made 
payments of public sector salaries exclusively 
through bank accounts, and improved the 
operation and oversight of Palestinian public 
investments. These reforms, according to the 
World Bank, had the result of “taking (the PA) 
from being a relative laggard in many respects 
(of public finance management) to setting an 
example for the MENA (Middle East and North 
Africa) region.” (World Bank, 2007d: vi).
These reforms, however, were viewed by the 
public as “too little too late” and, after the PA 
held elections under pressure from the United 
States in 2005, the Palestinian population elec-
ted a Hamas government. After having forced 
elections on Palestinians (and Israelis) and 
refusing to accept their results, the United Sta-
tes –and the rest of the western international 
community—isolated the newly elected Go-
vernment and stopped supporting it financially. 
In order to continue supporting the Palestinian 
population, they channeled their funds through 
newly created accounts outside the purview of 
the Ministry of Finance and directly under the 
President of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, as well 
as to non-governmental organizations. 
Governance and Economic Autonomy in the 
Salam Fayyad Government
The stand-off between the PA and the donor 
community came to an end in the West Bank 
with the establishment of a new government led 
by former Finance Minister Salam Fayyad. The 
combination of Mahmoud Abbas as President 
and Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister –one a re-
cognized reformer and the other a well-respec-
ted technocrat-- signaled the intention of the PA 
to turn a new page in leadership and policies. 
The Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 
(PRDP) they presented in December 2007 re-
flects this new consensus within the PA leader-
ship. The document clearly states in its pream-
ble that its goal is “stabilization and rebuilding 
of trust” (Palestinian National Authority, 2008) 
by enforcing security (within Palestine and in 
Israel), improving governance and reducing 
corruption, increasing prosperity and regaining 
legitimacy.
The latest reports of the IMF and the World 
Bank report that the Salaam Fayyad govern-
ment is making progress in institution-building, 
improved public finance management and fis-
cal consolidation (International Monetary Fund, 
2010; World Bank, 2009). They praise the PA 
for its fiscal management through its control on 
the public wage bill and the reduction in utility 
subsidies as well as its improvements in cash 
management and control on expenditure com-
mitments (International Monetary Fund, 2008). 
The Fund notes that the 2009 deficit was in line 
with the budget targets and that further adjust-
ment was planned in the 2010 budget. The IMF 
also noted that private sector confidence had 
increased in the West Bank due to the Pales-
tinian Authority (PA)’s track record in institu-
tion-building as well as its reforms in the securi-
ty, public finance, and governance areas.
Both institutions called on the donor community 
to support the government’s adjustment effort, 
in particular given the enormous needs of the 
reconstruction effort in Gaza. 
The World Bank also praised the government’s 
efforts to increase development expenditures 
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and to link policy-making, planning and bud-
geting, steps which are critical to sound gover-
nance and accountability. The Government has 
also taken measures to deliver on the thorny 
and long-delayed liberalization of the telecom-
munications market. To this effect, the agree-
ment to grant licenses to a new company –Wa-
ttanyye—to operate alongside PALTEL finally 
came into effect after over a year of delays in 
the approval and release of the licenses by the 
Israeli government. These reforms, entailing the 
reversal of many of the malpractices supported 
by the Paris Agreement, show that a PA with 
the necessary political is able to improve gover-
nance even in the current unsupportive circum-
stances. Opinion polls seem to appreciate the 
progress made by the PA and show a positive 
and improving appraisal of the Fayyad gover-
nment regarding both economic management 
and security.46 
The implementation of the PRDP can address 
one of the key shortcomings of previous gover-
nments by improving governance. In addition 
to good governance, however, two key econo-
mic outcomes will likely be needed to enhan-
ce the credibility of the current PA government 
and build the basis for increased economic 
autonomy. These two outcomes are an impro-
vement in economic performance and, hence, 
in the living standards of the Palestinian popu-
lation, and a clear focus on building strategic 
economic autonomy. An improvement in eco-
nomic performance, as the experience of the 
past two decades and basic economic logic 
46 Results of this poll show a steady increase in the pos-
itive evaluation of the Fayyad government. The majority (58 
percent) of respondents evaluate the performance of the 
Fayyad government in improving the economy positively 
(a 4-point increase since August 2008). Similarly, 60 per-
cent of respondents positively evaluate the performance of 
the Fayyad government in improving the security situation 
(Arab World for Research and Development, 2008).  
show, is highly unlikely to pan out unless there 
is a significant easing of current restrictions to 
access and movement of people and goods.47 
Movement is the lifeblood of any economy and, 
in the current circumstances, the Palestinian 
economy is likely to continue to turn inward 
into increasingly stagnating and self-contained 
local economies within checkpoints. The PA is 
making great efforts to improve security. Howe-
ver, for an easing of restrictions to take place, a 
decision in this regard is needed by the Gover-
nment of Israel and, for the moment, no such 
decision has been forthcoming.48
Our paper also suggests that, in addition to 
implementing the priorities of the PRDP –with 
all of which we concur—the PA should make 
it a priority to develop strategic economic au-
tonomy from Israel. Without institutional and 
policy autonomy, the prospects for the develo-
pment of the future institutions of an indepen-
dent Palestinian state will be severely impaired 
and it will be difficult for the PA to deliver the 
socio-economic outcomes the Palestinian po-
pulation expects. This paper’s section on poli-
cy recommendations will point out some areas 
where these choices are particularly important 
for the PA, especially in the trade, tariff and tax 
collection, and energy sectors. It will also pre-
sent summary recommendations for the donor 
community, the Arab world and the Government 
of Israel.
47 This is a point which has repeatedly been made by 
all development agencies as well as by the PA itself. For a 
description of existing obstacles, see World Bank (2007b). 
48 An easing of restrictions to movement and access 
within the West Bank would probably need the removal of 
settlements –as most checkpoints are there to protect set-
tlers—and the GoI has shown no political will to move in that 
direction. On the contrary, settlement expansion continues 
apace and with it the multiplication of restrictions to access 
and movement for Palestinians. 
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Conclusions
The de jure economic regime and policies go-
verning Palestine-Israel relations is one of sui 
generis economic integration featuring a cus-
toms union with labor flows. This is an economic 
regime appropriate for a liberal peace-time fra-
mework among sovereign and well-established 
states willingly seeking the benefits of econo-
mic integration. The context of Palestine-Israel 
relations, however, is completely different. It is 
a mercantilist context of war and occupation 
between two fundamentally unequal partners. 
One of them (Israel) is a well-established state 
with a developed economy and a strong military 
and it is occupying the other (Palestine), which 
is a weak nation with no formal state, fledgling 
institutions and no army. 
The result of imposing a liberal peace-time fra-
mework on a mercantilist reality of war and oc-
cupation has been a lopsided de jure regime. 
This regime consists of a customs union whose 
policies are determined unilaterally by Israel 
and extended to Palestine and labor flows en-
visaged as a general principle with the ability 
of each party to limit them at will. The de facto 
regime is even more problematic and appears 
wholly unbound by the legal restrictions envisa-
ged in the de jure framework. This framework 
is characterized by pervasive and highly unpre-
dictable restrictions to movement and access 
of people and goods, continued confiscation 
of natural resources (especially land and wa-
ter) and a regime of military and administrative 
decisions affecting all aspects of economic re-
lations. This regime is most accurately charac-
terized by its uncertainty and its unilateral de-
termination by Israel through its own economic, 
political and security considerations. 
The economic consequences of the combina-
tion of the above-described de jure and de facto 
economic regimes on the Palestinian economy 
are dependence, de-development and institu-
tional de-legitimization. The dependence of the 
Palestinian economy on the Israeli economy 
can be found at many levels including produc-
tion levels and productivity growth, trade, labor 
flows, fiscal revenues and electricity supply. 
They also extend to other aspects not exami-
ned in this paper such as currency, banking 
system, private sector business ties, the health 
sector and the environment. This dependence 
greatly reduces the degrees of freedom of the 
Palestinian Authority and keeps the Palestinian 
economy as an impoverished “appendix” of the 
Israeli economy. This dependence has also 
meant that the Palestinian economy is comple-
tely at the mercy of the Israeli economy and its 
fluctuations, the cycles of the conflict, and the 
policy decisions of the GoI. This economic leve-
rage has consistently been used by the GoI as 
a political tool in its conflict with Palestine. 
It has also led to de-development through a 
number of economic transmission mechanisms 
such as wage growth outstripping productivity 
growth, over-inflated land prices, high transport 
costs and uncertainty in delivery times and an 
increasingly closed and internally fragmented 
economy. The economic effects of these deve-
lopments have been reflected in low and decli-
ning investment levels, de-industrialization, an 
overall weakening of the productive structure 
and deficiencies in firm capacity. The overall im-
pact on the welfare of the Palestinian population 
has been dramatic. Real incomes per capita in 
2006 were 30 percent below their pre-intifada 
levels, and poverty and unemployment stood at 
46 and 24 percent respectively. 
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Finally, the gap between the de jure and the de 
facto economic regimes, the lack of sovereignty 
and the dependence of PA institutions on exter-
nal actors and exogenous factors, the support 
by the Paris Protocols and the GoI of poor go-
vernance in economic arrangements in the PA, 
and overall weak development results have 
contributed to the emergence of a deficit in the 
legitimacy of the fledgling institutions of the 
Palestinian Authority. Reversing these trends 
and making progress toward strengthening the 
economic autonomy and the effectiveness and 
credibility of Palestinian institutions will require 
a substantial change in the strategic direction 
of the economic regimes implemented so far. 
In particular, it will likely require a systematic 
but progressive and pragmatic re-engineering 
of economic relations away from Israel and 
towards the rest of the world.49 For this strate-
gy to pan out, it needs to be led by the PA and 
supported by the donor community and the Go-
vernment of Israel. 
Only with a strategy of systematically increa-
sing economic and institutional independence 
will Palestine be able to reduce points of fric-
tion with Israel, strengthen its institutions and 
economy and be able to gain the credibility and 
legitimacy it needs in front of its population. Ulti-
mately, the peace process will also benefit from 
a less imbalanced relationship between the two 
parties, greater autonomy among them, fewer 
49 This chapter is written from the vantage point of Pal-
estine. It is likely, however, that a strategy of progressive 
separation from the Palestinian economy is also advisable 
for Israel –chiefly for security reasons. A policy of increasing 
separation also seems to be what Israeli policy-makers are 
actively pursuing and stating as their goal. Hence, the Pal-
estinian economy may not have much choice but adjust to 
this ongoing de facto “de-coupling.” As long as the occupa-
tion of the West Bank and Gaza continues, however, Israel 
is legally responsible for the welfare of its population and 
hence cannot fully ‘de-couple” from its occupied territories. 
points of friction in their relationship and, hence, 
fewer opportunities for collective punishment 
which only worsen the chances for reconcilia-
tion. It is only through mutually-agreed steps 
undertaken autonomously by two independent 
states in a context of peace that real coope-
ration can ultimately emerge in the medium to 
long run. This scenario, however, is unfortunate-
ly still a long way off and acting as if it were here 
today will only put off its advent increasingly fur-
ther into the future. 
Recommendations
Although the ultimate solution to the Palestinian 
economic problem is the end of occupation, 
we still recommend the following as needed 
policies to mitigate the effect of the de facto 
mercantilist condition.  In order for the recom-
mendations to have an impact, if implemented, 
Israeli governments should take all measures 
necessary to allow for the reduction of obsta-
cles to movement and access by Palestinians 
within and between the West Bank and Gaza 
as well as facilitate imports into and exports out 
of Palestine. The implementation of the 2005 
Agreement on Movement and Access would 
be a good starting point. It should also avoid all 
measures of collective punishment as it is cu-
rrently implementing in Gaza. These measures 
are not only contrary to basic ethics and inter-
national law, but they also worsen Israel’s own 
security prospects, its standing in the interna-
tional community and the chances of the pea-
ce process as a whole. On the contrary, Israel 
should support the work of the PA and avoid all 
actions which undermine its legitimacy in front 
of the Palestinian population. 
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For the PA—we recommend that, in every ins-
titution-building and policy choice made by the 
PA, the question of whether it furthers or hin-
ders economic and institutional autonomy from 
Israel should be posed. We also encourage the 
PA to proceed with the implementation of its 
PRDP and its established priorities, including 
the improvement of governance and securi-
ty, as its ability to deliver on its objectives will 
critically affect its legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Palestinian population. Our recommendations 
are focused on the area of building economic 
autonomy. This issue is particularly relevant in 
the following areas:
Consider Establishment of a Free Trade Area. 
As has been pointed out by several studies be-
forehand, the possibility of turning the current 
customs union with Israel into a free trade area 
should be considered.50 This would enhance 
the economic policy autonomy of the PA by 
returning to it the capacity to make trade poli-
cy and set external tariffs. We believe that, as 
has also been pointed out by these studies, the 
trade regime chosen should be an appropria-
te one for a small open economy. It should also 
explore closer association with neighboring 
countries and, in particular, Jordan and Egypt, 
as well as the maintenance of the FTA with the 
EU and the US. 
Establish Economic Borders and Collect own 
Tariff and Trade Taxes. We recommend that 
the PA start collecting its own tariff and tax re-
venues on imports. This would end the current 
dependence of the PA on receiving “clearance 
revenues” from Israel. Under a new arrange-
ment, the PA would collect its own tariff reve-
50 See, for instance, World Bank (2006a) and Arnon & 
Bamya (2007: 188-212).
nues and VAT and excise taxes on imports. This 
collection could be carried out by the Customs 
Department of the Ministry of Finance of the PA 
or, if it were to be considered more politically 
or technically expedient, by a contracted inter-
national firm. The establishment of “economic 
borders” through points of collection between 
Israel and Palestine should in no way be viewed 
as impinging on the future borders of the Pales-
tinian State.51
Increase Energy Autonomy from Israel. The 
PA’s letter of energy sector policy of 1997 ex-
presses concern over the current over-depen-
dence on Israel for electricity supply and esta-
blishes the need to take into account “strategic 
national interests” in determining sector policy. 
The importance of greater energy autonomy is 
highlighted by the current energy crisis in Gaza 
as well as by the energy shortage in Israel.52 
Some critical decisions are currently pending in 
the energy sector which should be guided by 
the principle of building energy autonomy (es-
pecially from Israel):
• Own energy supply should urgently 
be enhanced. To this effect, the Gaza 
Power Plant’s (GPP) conversion from 
gasoil to gas should be undertaken 
soonest. This conversion, as has been 
pointed out by the World Bank’s 2007 
energy sector review, would allow for a 
significant expansion in electricity pro-
duction as well as a dramatic reduction 
51 The establishment of economic borders and com-
mencement of own collections has also been recommend-
ed by the Aix Group and by a number of World Bank reports.
52 “Israel…is facing a shortage of production that will 
last at least up to the target year of 2020. Therefore, one 
can expect that Israel will be reluctant to increase exports to 
Palestine” (Arnon & Bamya, 2007: 174).
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in electricity costs (to roughly 20 percent 
of their current cost).53 
• The Gaza Marine Field gas project 
should be developed in accordan-
ce with the principles of enhancing 
energy security. In particular, the op-
tion of exporting all the gas to Ashkelon 
in Israel for transformation into electrici-
ty and buying back a portion into Pales-
tine does not seem wise given the cu-
rrent energy crisis in Gaza and potential 
future repeats of an economic blockade 
by Israel. On the contrary, policies which 
would enhance energy security and di-
minish dependence on Israel should be 
considered, including: a) exploitation of 
Gaza Marine Field gas for use by the 
GPP in Gaza and potential export to 
Egypt and Israel; b) transit considera-
tions – if possible and in order to impro-
ve physical security, a dedicated system 
of delivery should be avoided as it may 
be more vulnerable to selective shut-
down; on the contrary, the possibility of 
mixing Gaza Marine gas with gas from 
the Yam Thetis field, or with gas expor-
ted from Egypt in order to diminish the 
risk of selective shutdown should be ex-
plored; moreover, if gas from Gaza Ma-
rine Field were landed directly in Gaza, 
rather than transiting through Israel, 
this would increase supply security to 
Gaza; c) market power –diversity of bu-
yers should be considered and monop-
sony situations, in particular from Israel, 
should be avoided. 
• Enhancing energy supply from 
Egypt and Jordan. The possibility of 
53 See World Bank (2007c: 37, Box 2).  
importing gas from Egypt (via El Arish) 
to increase electricity production at GPP 
until the Gaza Marine Field gas beco-
mes available in 2011 should be explo-
red as should the expansion of electrici-
ty supply from Jordan to the West Bank 
(by extending the current supply arran-
gements from Jordan to Jericho through 
JEDCO to other parts of the West Bank) 
and, hence, diminishing reliance on the 
Israel Electricity Company (IEC). 
Build independent infrastructure. The PA should 
forcefully pursue and seek international support 
for the urgent need of building of its own port 
and airport/s. If necessary, it could ask for su-
pport from third parties to operate security sys-
tems at such locations so that the security re-
quirements of both the PA and Israel could be 
fulfilled. At the same time, it should make clear 
to donors that projects for joint infrastructure 
with Israel, such as the recent proposal to build 
a joint airport in Netanya are not feasible or 
desirable in the short to medium-run given the 
current occupation and conflict situation. The 
likelihood of their being implemented is very 
small and, even if they were, the access to such 
infrastructure by Palestinians would continue to 
depend wholly on Israel, aggravating Palesti-
nian dependence and extending it to the area 
of critical infrastructure. 
For donors-- the donor community should 
encourage Palestinian economic autonomy, 
support PRDP implementation, hold the PA ac-
countable, and pressure Israel to reduce obsta-
cles to movement and access in Palestine lest 
all its efforts and those of the PA be in vain. In 
particular, the donor community should weigh 
each area of support to the PA with criteria of 
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economic and institutional autonomy from Israel 
in mind and aim to encourage Palestinians to 
build on own resources, develop economic ties 
with neighbors (especially Jordan and Egypt) 
and increase relations with the rest of the world 
rather than aggravating dependence on Israel. 
Donor recommendations of joint infrastructure 
and joint industrial zones, as mentioned above, 
are not feasible in the short-to-medium term 
and only aggravate Palestinian dependence on 
Israel. On the contrary, the donor community 
should support joint ventures between Palesti-
nian firms and companies from their own coun-
tries. In particular, donors should support any 
activities that promise diversification in Palesti-
nian economic relations and prospects for lear-
ning-by-doing and increasing market access 
for Palestinian entrepreneurs. Regarding infras-
tructure, donors should support the building of 
Palestine’s own port and airports and contribute 
in whichever way they can to ensure their finan-
cing and security arrangements.
For the Arab world—the Arab League should 
urgently implement its unanimous decision to 
allow tariff-free access to Palestinian products 
into its markets, explore opportunities for joint 
business ventures with Palestinian firms. Mo-
reover, oil-rich countries should consider the 
possibility of providing the Palestinian popula-
tion with subsidized oil which could substitute 
for the current Israeli petroleum monopoly pro-
vision to Palestine. Egypt and Jordan should 
consider all areas in which they can find win-win 
situations for economic cooperation with Pales-
tine. For instance, the increased supply of elec-
tricity exports to the West Bank (by Jordan) and 
Gaza (by Egypt) should seriously be examined. 
In particular, the Egyptian government could 
helpfully reconsider the proposal by private 
Egyptian businessmen to build a gas-powered 
electricity plant in Sinai to increase electricity 
exports to Gaza.
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